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حول هذا السجل


المجلد، المصنف على أنه سري، هو عبارة عن دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤، ويتضمن بيان الطباعة "مطبعة الحكومة المركزية في شيملا. - رقم 817 M. D 30 - 5.11.04. - F. D.". يبدأ المجلد بمقدمة بقلم ج. أ. سالدانا، بتاريخ ٠٥ أكتوبر ١٩٠٤ (الورقة ٣). ويلي ذلك قائمة بالمحتويات (الورقة ٤). ينقسم المجلد إلى ٤٥ قسمًا، ويسرد تاريخ الحركات الوهابية التي أثرت على الخليج العربي وعمان في القرن التاسع عشر. هذا التاريخ يستند إلى محاضر وزارة الخارجية في حكومة الهند والإدارة السياسية في حكومة بومباي.

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


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
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نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤." [٢ظ] (٦٨/٤)





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نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤." [٣و] (٦٨/٥)

PREFACE.

The *Précis of Nejd Affairs* from 1804 to 1904, based as it is mainly on the Proceedings of the Foreign Department and the Volumes of the Political Department, Bombay, is considerably indebted to the précises drawn up previously by Captain Talboys Wheeler, Major Henderson, Mr. Plowden, and Captain Shakespear.

This précis dwells more upon the Wahabi movements that threatened the peace of the Persian Gulf and the Oman seas, than the details of the internal affairs of Nejd, for which a reference is invited to the following works:—

- (1) History of the Wahabis in Arabia and India by E. Rehatsek—page 274 of Volume XIV—Journal, Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society.
- (2) Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabis by Burckhardt, 1830.
- (3) Bombay Government Records Selections No. XXIV, 1856—pages 428-460.


The recent affairs of Nejd complicated with those of Koweit are treated more minutely in the *Précis of Koweit Affairs*.


5th October 1904.

J. A. SALDANA.



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نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤." [٣] (٦٨/٦)





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PRÉCIS OF NEJD AFFAIRS.

1804—1904.

*I.—Rise of the Wahabis under Abdul Wahab ante 1740.

The sect of Wahabis was founded by Abdul Wahab, and his son, Mahomed bin Abdul Wahab, in the early part of the 18th century, in the country of Nejd in Arabia. Abdul Wahab was a native of Nejd. Like the prophet of Islam, he began life as a travelling merchant. In this capacity he visited Basrah and Baghdad, and even journeyed through Persia. On his return to Nejd, he began to promulgate his peculiar tenets, which did not involve the idea of a Reformation like Protestantism, but rather a return to the primitive simplicity which prevailed amongst the early followers of Islam, whilst the Prophet was still alive.

2. Under such circumstances, the Wahabis were neither Sunnis nor Shiabs.

Neither Sunnis nor Shiabs.

Both the latter sects sprung up after the death of Mahomet, and under circumstances which involved a veneration for certain individuals as successors of Mahomet; a veneration or adoration that is altogether opposed to the essence of Wahabism, which forbids all invocations to any man whatever, whether Saint or Prophet. The Sunnis pin their faith upon the three first Caliphs, Abubeker, Omar, and Othman, whom they considered to be the only true successors of the Prophet. The Shiabs, who deny the right of the three first Caliphs to succeed Mahomet, assert that Ali, the fourth Caliph, and husband of Mahomet's daughter Fatima, and Ali's two sons, Hassan, and Hussein, were the immediate successors of the Prophet. The Sunnis invoke the four first Caliphs. The Shiabs invoke Ali and his two sons. Besides these early Caliphs, both Sunnis and Shiabs offer up prayers to numbers of saints. Abdul Wahab, however, was above all such considerations. He reverted to the first formula of Islam,—“There is but one God!” He taught that God alone was the proper object of worship and invocation; and that Mahomet, Jesus Christ, Moses, and others, who were respected by the Sunnis as prophets, were, in reality, nothing more than great men.

3. It will thus be seen that whilst the rise of the Wahabis is to be ascribed

Early opposition between Nejd and Hejaz.

Important divisions.

Western Region on the Red Sea.	1.—Hejaz, the cradle of Islam comprising Mecca and Medina.
Central Region	2.—Nejd, the central land now occupied by the Wahabis, but sometimes stretching to the Persian Gulf.
Eastern Region	3.—Oman, under the Imam of Maskat, between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

to a date so late as the commencement of the last century, the causes of that rise may be referred to a very remote period. From time immemorial there has been always an opposition between the people of Nejd, or the central table land of Arabia, and the people of Hejaz on the coast of the Red Sea. The people of Nejd are sober and austere, averse to all foreign luxury and display, and tenaciously attached to their ancestral usages. The people of Hejaz on the sea-coast are, on the other hand, light and volatile, dissolute in their manners, and fond of ornament and magnificence. This opposition between the people of the central highlands, and the livelier people on the sea-coast, has been aggravated by political events. During the century which preceded the advent of Mahomet, the men of Nejd had maintained a supremacy in Arabia; but in consequence of the spread of Islam, this supremacy was ultimately transferred to the men of Hejaz. Again there was a rivalry of prophets. When Mahomet began to preach in Hejaz, a rival prophet, named Moseilemah, began to preach in Nejd. Mahomet, treated Moseilemah with scorn, and nicknamed him “the Liar,” but whenever a new chapter of the Koran was promulgated by Mahomet, a burlesque imitation of it was promulgated by Moseilemah. A collision between the followers of the rival prophets was consequently to be expected; but the men of Hejaz were for a long period afraid to attack the men of Nejd. It was only after the former had been disciplined by extended conquest that they marched against Nejd. Then an obstinate battle ensued in which Moseilemah was slain; but Riyadh, the capital of Nejd and native place of

* This and the 2nd Chapter are taken from the excellent introductory Chapter of Captain Talboys Wheeler's History of the Wahabis.



Moseilemah, maintained such a stout resistance, that the men of Hejaz were obliged to offer terms. The result was that the people of Nejd retained their liberty and independence on the condition of making a nominal profession of Islam.

4. During the eleven centuries which intervened between the rise of Islam in the seventh century, and the outbreak of the Wahabis in the eighteenth century, the history of Arabia is almost a blank. The progress of affairs, however, was largely influenced by previous events, which have been much neglected by historians, but which may, perhaps, be briefly indicated here. It appears that, about a century before the advent of Mahomet, the old empire of Yemen, of which dim memorials are preserved in Himyaritic inscriptions, was already on the decline. Originally established in Southern Arabia, it had gradually extended over the Hejaz, Nejd, and Oman, and also over an undefined territory beyond the exact limits of those provinces. This Yemanite empire was broken up by Abyssinian invasions. On the north-west the territory of Ghassan was finally absorbed in the Byzantine empire. On the north-east the territory of Heira, in like manner, became an outlying province of Persia, which was at that time under the dominion of the Sassanides. On the south the Yemanite dynasty was subsequently resuscitated by a Himyarite Chief, who drove out the Abyssinian invaders, and established his rule over a large and important territory, of which Oman was a viceroyalty; but this Yemanite dynasty, like that of Heira, was compelled to pay tribute to Persia. In the centre the rude clans of Nejd established their independence, and exercised a supremacy over other quarters of the peninsula.

Four Governments in Arabia at the advent of Mahomet.

5. At the advent of Mahomet there were thus four different Governments in Arabia:—

1st.—The Byzantine empire on the north-west, which had extended its frontier to within an easy distance of Medina.

2nd.—The Persian province of Heira on the north-east, which extended from the lower Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, and inland to the limits of Nejd Proper.

3rd.—The Yemanite rule, including Oman, and also paying tribute to Persia.

4th.—The Nejd tribes on the central table land, who were grouped round the prophet Moseilemah.

Besides these four Governments, several small but energetic Jewish communities possessed independent strongholds. The Bedouin tribes also, who had been emancipated by the great convulsion which had rent Central and Northern Arabia from the empire of Yemen, had obtained considerable importance, and did much to aggravate the prevailing confusion.

6. The political idea of Mahomet and his companions in Hejaz was to conquer the entire peninsula, and bring it under one law, religion, and dominion. The result is a matter of history. The Greeks were vanquished, and the authority of the Byzantine empire was banished for ever from Arabia. The Persian authority in Heira was overthrown by the fiery enthusiasm of the early Mussulmans. The people of Yemen suffered themselves to be incorporated into the Hejaz empire almost without a blow. The Jews were either driven out or extinguished. The people of Nejd alone stood aloof under their prophet Moseilemah, and only gave in a nominal adherence after a severe and obstinate struggle. Under such circumstances, the people of Nejd still nourished a bitter hatred against Hejaz and Islam, and naturally yielded to the tendency to abandon their allegiance to the prophet of Hejaz, and to return to their ancient customs and institutions.

7. Here it may be remarked that the political strength of Islam lay in the fact that it was a rallying point for all the dwellers in towns and enthusiastic lovers of Arab freedom, against the lawlessness of the Bedouin marauders and





the aggressions of foreign rule. But Islam had no such charms for the people of Nejd. Moreover, the subsequent transfer of the Caliphate from Hejaz to Syria, and finally to Baghdad, loosened the ties which bound the people of Arabia to the creed of Islam. Ultimately all the provinces on the Persian Gulf, and Nejd in its largest sense, were dis severed from the Caliphate of Baghdad. From that date the people of Arabia have been left to work out their own destiny; and until the reign of the late Mahomed Ali over Egypt no attempt was made to march a military force into the interior. Western Asia has been convulsed by Crusaders from the west and Tartars from the east, but Arabia has been effectually shut out from foreign invasion. Meantime, each district in Arabia grouped itself around its own Chiefs and nobles, and passed through centuries of feud and rivalry in all the liberty of misrule. But still the great demarcation which prevailed before the advent of Mahomet continues down to the present day, and the old antagonism is still at work between the peoples of Nejd, Hejaz, and Oman.

8. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that when Abdul Wahab appeared, every trace of Islam had passed away from Nejd. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the people of Nejd followed their old ancestral faith, and worshipped the Jinn in cavernous recesses, or beneath the shade of large trees, and invoked the dead and sacrificed at their tombs. Traces of the doctrines of Moselemah still remained, together with remnants of old Sabaeen institutions; but the Koran was unread, the five daily prayers were forgotten, no one cared where Mecca lay, and tithes, ablutions, and pilgrimages were unknown. The religious dogma which was taught by Abdul Wahab that there was but one God, and that he was the God above all the Jinn or local gods, was received by the people of Nejd with alternate persecution and approval, much in the same manner that it had been originally received eleven centuries previously by the people of Hejaz. Still, however, the doctrines of Abdul Wahab must have had a peculiar charm for the people of Nejd, inasmuch as they were not only opposed to the practices of the men of Hejaz, but were in accordance with the special character of the people of the central highlands. This Abdul Wahab taught that the Prophet, who was invoked by the men of Hejaz, was only a man; and perhaps, he may have added that as such he was no better than the Prophet who had been originally followed by the men of Nejd. He also taught that wearing silk clothes and smoking tobacco were great sins; and both were foreign to the national character, although both were practised by the men of Hejaz. Moreover, the contempt for ornaments, decorations, and ceremonies of every kind, even to the absence of mats from the mosques, and the neglect to take off the shoe before saying prayers, all of which are peculiar to the Wahabis, are at the same time expressions of an austerity which is in perfect accordance with the rude simplicity of the people of Nejd, and an expression of antagonism against the luxury and magnificence of the people of Hejaz.

9. Abdul Wahab died about 1760, but it is difficult to say whether he, or his son Mahomed, should be regarded as the founder of the sect of Wahabis. It is certain, however, that about this time some opposition was excited against the new doctrines, not because of their austere and puritanical character, but because of the national opposition of the people of Nejd to the doctrines of Islam, which, in their original purity, were involved in the new tenets. Under these circumstances, Mahomed bin Abdul Wahab took refuge with the Arab Chief of Deriah, named Saud. He solemnly promised that, if Saud would espouse the cause of God and make his sword the sword of Islam, he should become before his death the sole monarch of Nejd and the first potentate in Arabia. Saud accepted the offer, and professed Islam in all its purity under the direction of the Wahabi; and he gave himself out as the apostle of the new doctrine and sword of faith. Saud reigned for many years, and left to his sons the undisputed sovereignty of Inner Arabia, and a name which was respected throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Meantime, Mahomed bin Abdul Wahab supported the sword of Saud by his words and writings, but never interfered with the affairs of State, and died in 1787 at the advanced age of ninety-five.

Separation of the Political and Spiritual power about 1765.



10. Ever since the death of Mahomed bin Abdul Wahab, his family have always held the highest judicial and religious posts in the Wahabi empire; but, unlike their ancestors, they have exercised a predominant influence in the State, although they never adopted the official titles appertaining to pure civil or military authority. His son Abdullah is said to have been put to death in 1818 by the great massacre of the doctors of Nejd, which was ordered by Ibrahim Pasha, and which will be noticed hereafter. His grandson, Abdul Rahman, was still alive at Riyadh, but in decrepid old age when Palgrave visited that city in 1862. His great-grandson, Abdul Latif, was also alive, aged about forty, and the father of a large family.

II.—Political History of Nejd ante 1800 to 1804.

11. At the death of Saud, about the end of the last century, his authority was acknowledged not only in the province of Nejd proper, but also from the Persian Gulf to the frontiers of Hejaz. Whilst, however, Saud extended his empire over minor tribes, he carefully avoided any encroachment upon the great powers. He respected the supremacy of Persia over the island of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, and its protectorate of Katif upon the coast. He attempted no aggressions upon the Sultan of Oman, known as the Imam of Maskat. Above all, he never violated the frontiers of the Meccan Haram, nor in any way excited the animosity of Turkey or Egypt. He was a thorough Wahabi, but he patronised learning as far as it was compatible with the tenets of Wahabi doctrines: and he adorned his capital at Deriah with national and religious monuments, such as an enormous palace and an immense mosque, of which the remains still testify to the magnificence of the first Wahabi sovereign.

12. Saud left two sons, Abdul Aziz and Abdullah. Abdul Aziz, the elder, succeeded to the throne, but although he had been warned by his father "not to undermine the cliff," in other words, not to excite the dangerous hostility of Turkey or Persia, he was nevertheless bent upon extending the Wahabi empire. His first campaign was against Persia. He took Katif by storm, and then occupied Bahrein and the adjacent island; and pushed across to the eastern coast of the Gulf, to the maritime district of Barr-Faris; and, according to Palgrave, he detached Barr-Faris irrecoverably from Persian rule. After this Abdul Aziz sent an expedition, under his brother Abdullah, against the Sultan of Oman. Abdullah gained a succession of victories, and finally reached the heights of Maskat, and turned the fort batteries against the town below. At that time Syud Saeed was Sultan of Oman, or Imam of Maskat. Syud Saeed yielded to the storm, and not only agreed to pay a yearly tribute to the Wahabi ruler, but admitted Wahabi garrisons into his kingdom, and permitted the erection of Wahabi mosques in Maskat and elsewhere.

13. Persia was alarmed at these successes of the Wahabi Chieftain, but dared not send a Persian army into the wilds of Arabia. Accordingly, she had recourse to a weapon which has ever been familiar to the Shiah, namely, the dagger of the assassin. A fanatic of Ghilan offered to murder Abdul Aziz. In the first instance, he received his instructions at Tehran, and then journeyed to Meshid Hussein,* the Mecca of the Shiah, and procured a written pardon for all past or future sins, and an assurance of the eternal joys of paradise, if he delivered the earth from the tyrant of Nejd. He then proceeded to Deriah, and took his stand behind Abdul Aziz at evening prayer; and whilst the latter was bending in adoration, he plunged his sharp Khorasan dagger through his body. Abdul Aziz fell down dead, without a groan or struggle. His attendants seized their swords, which they had laid aside for prayer, and hewed the assassin to pieces on the floor of the mosque; and they then found upon his corpse the written engagement countersigned by the Governor of Meshid Hussein.



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
14. Abdullah succeeded his brother as ruler of Nejd, and swore vengeance against the town of Meshid Hussein. About 1801 he marched an army towards the western bank of the Euphrates, and, after an unsuccessful effort to storm Meshid Ali, he reached Meshid Hussein, took the town by storm, and massacred large numbers of the garrison and inhabitants. He also destroyed the tomb of Hussein with all the fanaticism of a Wahabi, and then returned to Nejd.

15. In 1803, Abdullah determined on the conquest of Hejaz, which at that time was under the rule of Ghalib, Sherif of Mecca. For years, Ghalib had shown a hostile feeling against the Wahabis, and had endeavoured to excite the Turkish Government to put down their rule in Nejd. The expedition of Abdullah against Hejaz proved successful. He captured the sacred town of Mecca, and not only massacred the garrison, but many of the most venerated Sherifs and Syuds. He destroyed every vestige of superstition, and restored the Kaaba to the naked purity of Islam. He enjoined punctual attendance at public prayers, and strictly forbade the use of silk and tobacco, according to the rules of Wahabism. He prohibited alike Sunnis and Shi'ahs from entering Mecca, unless they paid a suitable tribute in money, and furnished a factory testimonial of their orthodoxy. Even the sister of the Sultan of Turkey was sent back from the Meccan frontier "with sorrow and shame" before she had kissed the black stone. In 1804, Abdullah marched against Medina, which he captured with ease, and then destroyed the tomb of the Prophet, and carried away all the jewels and pearls and manuscripts of the Koran which had been deposited there; and in like manner he destroyed the tombs of the Sunni saints, including those of Abubeker and Omar. He then carried fire and sword beyond his northern frontier, but meantime a formidable revolt broke out in the province of Hareek on his southern frontier. Abdullah hastened with his trustiest vassals to put down the rising, which was at length only suppressed by wholesale destruction and massacre. In the town of Hoota he burnt down every house and butchered every man and child; so that out of a male population of ten thousand only a hundred and thirty are said to have escaped the sword.

III.—Genealogy of Wahabi Amirs.

16. In order to form a clear idea of the history of Nejd, it is desirable to bear in mind the following genealogical* table of the Nejd Wahabi Amir's family:—

*Taken from the Administration Report of Persian Gulf for 1879-80 and supplemented from a recent record.





"دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون
نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤." [٧ظ] (١٤/٦٨)

6

IV.—First encroachments of the Wahabis on Oman, 1804—1808.

17. We are now brought face to face with the Wahabis in the Persian Gulf. The growing influence of the Wahabis justly alarmed the Persian and Turkish Governments, who offered to unite with Maskat in repelling the common danger. At this juncture, however, several of the principal Chiefs of Oman were induced to array their influence on the side of the Wahabis under a compact which recognized their independence of Maskat. Cut off from all support, except what he derived from Mekran and the country westward of Maskat, the Imam was compelled to make peace with the Wahabis on their own terms.

18. In the year 1804, the Imam of Maskat was killed in a battle with the Uttubis. He left two young sons whose rights were disputed by their uncle Syud Ghes of Sohar. To oppose his pretensions they entrusted the care of the Government to their cousin Syud Beder. This person had during the late Imam's life time allied himself to the Wahabis, and he now called in their aid, by which, for the first time, they were enabled to obtain a firm footing in Maskat. By the help of the Wahabis, Syud Beder reduced the rebellious Syud Ghes to submission, and recovered possession of Bunder Abbas and Ormuz, both of which places had been seized by the Chief of Kishm. In his expedition to Bunder Abbas and Ormuz, Syud Beder was accompanied by the Resident, Captain Seton, with two of the Company's cruisers. Our Marine was at this time actively engaged in putting down the Joasmi pirates, who had a short time before captured the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*. In 1806 a combined British and Maskat fleet proceeded to Kishm and successfully blockaded the Joasmis, when they sued for terms. This led to the conclusion of the Treaty with the Joasmi tribe dated the 6th February 1806.

19. During the next two years the supineness of the Persian and Turkish Governments, and the weakness arising from the disputed succession in Maskat, enabled the Wahabis completely to establish their ascendancy in Oman.

V.—(1) The Joasmi pirates under Wahabi influence first venture into the Indian Seas. (2) Expedition against Joaswis and Wahabis, 1809—1813.

20. In 1808 the Wahabi power rose to its height. They held the revenues of the upper part of Oman, and ruled over the powerful tribe of the Joasmis to the exclusion of their own Chief, who was compelled to abandon his country. It was under this influence that the Joasmis ventured to extend their piratical depredations to the Indian Seas, an object long contemplated by the Wahabis.

21. It was now apprehended that the Maskat State would be drawn into the general system of piracy which prevailed in the Gulf unless relieved from the pressure employed by the Wahabis to reduce it. The Arab Sheikhs chafed at the tyranny and insults of the Wahabi Officers, and only waited for a signal to re-unite under the Imam's standard. Taking advantage of the absence of the Wahabi Chief on a visit to Mecca in 1809, the Imam fitted out an expedition in which the Uttubis and a party of the Joasmis offered to join against the common enemy. The expedition sailed down the Gulf under the personal command of Syud Saeed, but it terminated without accomplishing anything.

22. The Resident, Captain Seton, represented that nothing but the interference of the British Government could prevent the destruction of Maskat as a port of commerce, and its shipping being added to the resources of the pirates—an opinion in which Captain (afterwards Sir J.) Malcolm entirely concurred. Influenced by these considerations the Supreme Government determined on despatching an armament to the Gulf for the suppression of piracy, as well as for the protection of Maskat. The armament proceeded in the first place



to the Pirate ports, and after operating successfully against Ras-ul-khyma, Linga and Luft, repaired to Maskat. On being joined by the Imam's forces, an expedition was directed against the important position of Shinas, which, after a sanguinary and heroic defence on the part of the Wahabi Officer, was surrendered to the British and made over to our ally. The armament then returned to Bombay.

23. The British Government had at all times desired to observe a strict neutrality towards the Wahabis. The expedition of 1809-10 was in consequence conducted with a degree of caution and forbearance towards the Wahabi Chief which rendered its results of little permanent efficacy. Captain Seton was instructed

"to be careful to make it in due time fully known to the Wahabi, and all the Officers of his Government, that it was our sincere wish to continue at all times on terms of friendship with him and the other States of Arabia, desiring only to provide for the security of the general commerce of the Seas, and of the Gulf of Persia in particular, so long and so unjustifiably interrupted by the Joasmis, in breach also of a positive Treaty concluded with their Chief in 1806; the motives and objects of interposition involving no views of aggrandizement on our part, but being altogether limited to the repression of Maritime depredations, such as is equally condemned by the professors of every religion, and the just support of our ally, the Imam of Maskat, cannot reasonably give offence to any other State or Government."

24. Soon after the withdrawal of our armament from the Persian Gulf, the Wahabis again appeared in the vicinity of Maskat, committing devastations of all kinds. The Imam appealed to the British Government for assistance, urging that his co-operation with us in the late expedition had involved him in perpetual warfare with the Wahabi Chief. The Supreme Government, however, considered it impracticable to render any assistance without making it appear that we were united in a contest against the Wahab power which was contrary to our repeatedly declared policy.

25. The Wahabi Chief had at this time entered into a correspondence with the Resident at Bushire, having reference to the operations lately undertaken for the punishment of the Joasmis. On this correspondence being submitted to the Bombay Government, the Honourable Mr. Duncan was induced to address the Wahabi Chief in the following terms (letter dated the 9th August 1810):—

"The British Government receives with satisfaction the expression of your desire to maintain with it the relations of amity and concord—a desire in which it cordially participates and has uniformly manifested. It is, therefore, proper that I should assure you that the late expedition to the Persian Gulf did not originate in hostility towards you, but was, as above noticed, directed solely to the destruction of the pirates who had in direct breach of their own positive engagements, and with an entire forgetfulness of the former instances of condescending lenity manifested towards them, long infested the seas in that quarter, plundering vessels and murdering subjects of all nations indiscriminately, for the British Government does not concern itself with the hostilities carried on by you against the members of the Mussulman faith, on account of their alleged deviation from the ordinances of the Koran, and its power will alone be directed against those who, exercising the detestable profession of piracy, are the common enemies of all nations.

"The channel of communication between us being now open, I request you will continue to afford me the pleasure of hearing of your prosperity and success."

26. In April 1811 the Wahabi troops appeared in the vicinity of Maskat, attacking and plundering the possession of the Imam. The Imam represented on this occasion to the Bombay Government that his co-operation with his friends and allies, the English, in the late expedition had involved him in a perpetual and implacable war with the Wahabis, with whom he was before at peace, and trusted that the British Government would not remain neutral during the struggle which he was making to defend his possessions and capital from the invasion of an ancient and inveterate enemy whose resentment had thus been strongly re-excited against him.



26-A. But the Supreme Government answered the Imam that it was unnecessary to regulate his reply to any overtures on the part of the Wahabis by reference to his connection with the British Government, which had always considered itself to be at peace with that tribe, the late co-operation with the Imam not having been in prosecution of war against the Wahabis generally, but merely for the extirpation of the pirates, whose augmented power and audacity had endangered the security of his own dominions, as well as interrupted the commerce and navigation of the Gulf; that the British Government, therefore, was no further interested in the contest between him and the Wahabis than it was solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of the Imam. Under the influence of that solicitude, and a just sense of the benefits and blessings of a state of peace, it was recommended to the Imam to grant the terms of pacification solicited by the Wahabis if consistent with the honour and security of the State of Maskat.

VI.—First Egyptian invasion of Nejd, 1814—1819.

27. The relief, however, which we were indisposed to afford came at this time to the Imam indirectly, and from an unexpected quarter, namely, from Egypt. Soon after the appointment of Mahomed Ali as Pasha of Egypt in 1813, his energetic and skilful character made its influence felt throughout his Pashalic. He directed early attention to the Hejaz, which was then held by one of the sons of the Wahabi Chief and entering that province at the head of a large force he compelled the Wahabis to vacate Jeddah and Mecca, and retire within their own frontiers. Alarmed at the determined attitude taken up by the Turkish Government, the Wahabi Chief sought to conciliate the friendship of the different powers in the Persian Gulf. He made overtures at first to Persia, and then to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to form a connection with the British Government of mutual amity and friendship which might be beneficial to both States, and acknowledging the superiority of the British over every other nation at sea, proposed that the ports of each State should be open to each other, and a free and unmolested trade carried on by their subjects. The Supreme Government, to whom these proposals were submitted, thought it undesirable at that moment to enter into any regular engagement with the Wahabis even of a commercial character, but considered it politic "to maintain a friendly intercourse with the Wahabi Chief, and endeavour by cordial and conciliatory conduct to confirm the amicable disposition which he appeared to entertain towards the British Government." (Letter dated 18th February 1814.)

28. An Envoy was about the same time deputed by the Wahabi Chieftain to Maskat, who announced his arrival at that place to the Bombay Government, with the object of restoring "the relations of amity between the two powers." In reply Sir Evan Nepean wrote—

"Entertaining, as I have always done, the most friendly disposition towards your master I conceived it my duty, even previously to the receipt of your letter, to instruct Mr. Bruce, the British Resident at Bushire, to communicate with His Highness Saud bin Abdul Aziz, and to establish such an amicable intercourse with him as cannot fail to be equally advantageous to both countries, as well as for the general benefit of their respective neighbours, and it is with feelings of particular satisfaction I have observed your Excellency has stated that a corresponding desire is sincerely entertained by His Highness Saud bin Abdul Aziz, and I shall, therefore, look forward with confidence to the speedy attainment of our reciprocal wishes."

29. The Wahabi Chief Saud died in 1814, and was succeeded by his son Abdullah, who directed his efforts to strengthen his authority over the surrounding Arab tribes.

30. In 1819 the Turks under Ibrahim Pasha, following up their successes against the Wahabis, advanced towards their capital of Deriah, which they



invested and reduced to ruins, making prisoners the Wahabi Chief and other members of his family. The inhabitants of the ill-fated city were at the same time removed to Haasa which it was determined to establish as the future capital of this part of Arabia under the Beni-Khalid tribe. The Turkish troops then marched towards the shores of the Persian Gulf, intending as it was understood to retaliate upon the piratical tribes for their lawless and sanguinary proceedings towards the subjects of the Porte.

31. The Supreme Government had for some time contemplated an expedition on a large scale against the Joasmi pirates, and on hearing of the arrival of the Turkish Army on the Arabian Coast the Governor-General resolved on communicating with Ibrahim Pasha for the purpose of learning whether the Naval and Military forces at the command of the Bombay Government could be applied in conjunction with the Turkish Army for the complete reduction of the Joasmis. Captain Sadlier was entrusted with the delivery of the Governor-General's despatch to Ibrahim Pasha. An account of his mission, and the journey he undertook to accomplish has been published.

32. The British expedition sailed from Bombay under the command of General Keir about the end of 1819, and, with the co-operation of the Imam of Maskat, destroyed or captured all the vessels and the principal strongholds of the piratical Chieftains. The dread inspired by the success of the British arms in the reduction of Ras-ul-khyma led to the more powerful Arab Sheikhs sending offers of unequalled submission to General Keir. On the 8th January 1820 a general Treaty of Peace was concluded with nearly all the Chiefs of the Maritime Arabs in the Gulf, the provisions of which have since been more or less respected.

33. The Amir Abdullah was sent prisoner to Constantinople and there decapitated. So complete was the overthrow of the Wahabi power, that an historical sketch of the sect drawn up by Mr. Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay about the year 1820, concludes in the following terms:—

"Thus rose and fell, it is to be hoped never to rise again, the extraordinary sect of the Wahabis, under whose protection and encouragement maritime depredations were carried on in the Gulf and in the Indian Seas with a degree of success, audacity, and barbarity, which has been surpassed only by the atrocities of the Algerines in Europe."

VII. Resurrection of the Wahabis under Turki, 1824—1830.

34. But Mr. Warden's anticipation was by no means realised. There was plenty of vitality remaining in the sect, and after six years of Egyptian domination a general insurrection was headed by the son of the late Amir, Turki bin Abdullah, or as he is more commonly called, Turki bin Saud. The Egyptian Governor was compelled to fall back on Kasim, and Turki was unanimously proclaimed Sultan of Nejd and restorer of the Wahabi power. The restoration of Deriah was neither practicable nor desirable; so Turki fixed on the neighbouring town of Riadh as his capital and fortified it. These events happened in 1824, and Wahabism from that time entered on a fresh career of aggressive expansion. Turki soon opened a correspondence with all the Sheikhs on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, inviting them to renew the relations which had subsisted between them prior to the overthrow of the Wahabis by Ibrahim Pasha. As a consequence of this overture Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar, the Chief of the Joasmis, in November 1825 brought to the notice of the British authority in the Persian Gulf his "great alarm at the increasing power and intrigues of the Wahabis," and professed himself very anxious to learn whether he might look to the English for assistance in the event of his endeavouring to maintain his independence.



"In reply, he was informed, in general terms, that he was the best judge of his own interests; but that no connection or authority would be received by the British Government as an excuse for any proceedings bearing a predatory character. The Sheikh then adverted to the very difficult dilemma into which he would be cast in the event of Wahabis attacking the territories of the Imam, and calling on him for his support against that Prince. To this he was answered, that his forming any connection prejudicial to His Highness would be considered unfriendly by us, and it was in every point of view advisable that he should not adopt that line of conduct. The language held on this occasion was confirmed by the Governor in Council, with a further intimation, that however improbable it might be that we should act against the Wahabis so long as they confined their conquests to the shore, it was still not desirable that we should bind ourselves to abstain from interposition, or hold out so great an encouragement to the invasion of the Imam's territories as our avowed indifference would be likely to afford."

35. The following five or six years were occupied by Turki in reconstructing his father's kingdom, and in recovering one after another the provinces formerly subject to Wahabi rule. At the same time he endeavoured to conciliate the Pasha of Egypt by the payment of a small annual tribute. In 1831 his recovery of Hasa and Katif so alarmed the Imam of Maskat, that that Chief was fain to be taken under his protection on the terms of acknowledging his supremacy and paying an annual tribute. And thus the whole of the Arabian Coast from Ras-ul-Hud to Koweit (with the exception of Abuthabi) became tributary to the Wahabis

VIII.—Overtures to British Government. 1831.

33. About the middle of the year 1831 a communication was made to the Governor of Bombay by the Wahabi Chief, through Sheikh Rashid bin Humid of Ajman, expressive of his desire to be upon the same intimate footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saud and "to have the treaty renewed which was made between you the British and Imam Saud". To this a reply in general but friendly terms was transmitted through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

37. With reference to this allusion to a Treaty, the Persian Secretary reported that only two documents could be found on the records relating to our intercourse with the Wahabis, viz., those quoted in paragraphs 25 and 28 *supra*. In acknowledging the communication last received, the Honourable Mr. Romer thus addressed the Wahabi Chief:—

"Your communication dated the 25th of Jumadyooluwul, informing me that by the appointment of the Ruler of Events you had arrived at the dignity of Chief of the Wahabi sect has reached my hands, and given me the gratification which friends feel when they receive intelligence from friends."

"Your disposition to a friendly understanding is met with reciprocal feeling, and the terms of amity which existed between this Government and your great ancestor, Imam Saud, will still remain in force and I cherish hopes will never be broken or infringed. I send this letter by the hands of your faithful dependant, Esa bin Hassan, to express the same."

IX. (1) Wahabi invasion of Oman, (2) views of the Government of India as to the claims of Maskaton the British Government, 1833-34.

38. In 1833, the influence of the Wahabis again became predominant in Oman, and at the invitation of most of the tribes, they marched an army into the province. The Imam finding the integrity of his dominions seriously menaced, considered it his best policy to form a closer connection with the Wahabi Chief. It was accordingly agreed by him to pay a tribute of 5,000 German crowns per annum to the Wahabi Chief, that each should hold possession of his own coast according to the limits then existing—the Imam's extending to Jalaam, and the Wahabi's to Katif; and further an engagement was entered into, binding them reciprocally to assist in putting down any rebellions arising in their respective territories.

39. On these circumstances being reported to the Bombay Government, the question arose as to whether the subversion of the power of the Imam of Maskat would be adverse to British interests in the Gulf, and whether the Imam had not a claim on the British Government for protection. The question having been referred to Calcutta, the Supreme Government * intimated:—

* Mr. Deputy Secretary Trevelyan's letter, dated 1st February 1834.



"The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council is not prepared to sanction the employment of the British arms for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the continental possessions of the Imam of Maskat. If we were once to commit ourselves by a declaration of our intention to support that Chief, this line of policy must be followed up at any expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and treasure which might ensue in consequence.

"The Wahabis evidently exist in considerable force, and the Imam has acknowledged their ascendancy by entering into tributary engagements with them, and engaging to hold his forces at their disposal for carrying on offensive operations against their enemies. If both parties are left to themselves, a sense of mutual interest will probably lead them to abstain from carrying to extremity any differences that may hereafter arise between them, whereas if we were to make an offer of military assistance to the Imam, he would probably avail himself of the support of our alliance to rid himself of the burden of the connection which he has been forced to enter into with the Wahabis, and we should become involved in a series of distressing operations, carried on at a distance from our resources and under great disadvantages from the heat of the climate and the nature of the country, against a brave people with whom we have ourselves no cause of dispute of any kind.

"Our concern is only with the maritime commerce of the Gulf, and as long as that is not molested it matters not to us whether one power or another holds dominion on its shores. Even if the Wahabis were to get possession of the harbour of Maskat, an event, of which the Imam himself does not appear to entertain any apprehension, it does not of necessity follow that they would commence a system of piracy. It is more probable that, being already sensible, from their recollection of past events in the Gulf, of our maritime superiority, they would dread to provoke us, and, as they would, under the circumstances supposed, have taken their place as a substantive power in that quarter, that they would be glad to continue the same friendly connection with us which has always subsisted between us and the Imam.

"It is believed that the Joasmis and other Arab tribes in the Wahabi interest are even now possessed of establishments in the Gulf, but we do not hear of any piracies being committed by them. They are probably restrained by the fear of our well-known ability to punish them, and this salutary dread would be likely to have even a greater influence over their conduct than it has at present, after they become possessed of a port like Maskat with a flourishing trade and other interests at stake which they must sacrifice by provoking hostility with us.

"But even if the worst contingency that can be supposed likely to take place were actually to happen, and the Wahabis were not only to acquire possession of the port of Maskat, but also to commit acts of piracy upon the Gulf trade, it is conceived that it would be much cheaper and easier to chastise them under these circumstances than to take up the question in its present state and constitute ourselves the guardians of the possessions of the Imam of Maskat against all his enemies. In the former case the whole extent of our operations would be comprised in such measures as might be deemed most advisable for the purpose of putting down piracy, while in the latter we might become engaged in a system of continental warfare, the final result of which it would be impossible to foresee. In the former case we should know exactly how far we should be committed, we should engage with all the advantage arising from our maritime superiority, and, under Providence, success would certainly attend our efforts; while in the latter we should abandon our vantage ground to fight the Wahabis in their own country, we should unnecessarily provoke the hostility of a free and powerful people, and should be involved in difficulties from which we could not retreat with honor.

"On the whole His Lordship in Council considers it fortunate that it has been so clearly established by the result of former discussions that we are not under any defensive engagements with the Imam of Maskat, and it is requested that the British Authorities in the Gulf may be instructed to observe a strict neutrality in any disputes that may arise between him and any of his neighbours on the Continent of Arabia. From a reference to the 15th paragraph of Mr. Warden's memorandum, dated 17th February 1826, it will be observed that this line of policy is in strict accordance with that which was prescribed by the Supreme Government when the Imam solicited our aid against the Wahabis after the expedition against the Joasmi pirates in 1808, on the plea that owing to the assistance he afforded us on that occasion they (the Wahabis) threatened to overwhelm him. At present so far from entertaining such an apprehension, he appears to rely with a considerable degree of confidence on his Treaty with them, and the main purport of his communication to Mr. Blane was to enquire how he was to act in case they called upon him to engage in hostile measures against neighbouring States. Mr. Blane's answer was marked by great judgment, and it is hoped that if the Imam adopts the prudent course recommended to him by that gentleman, he will not be subjected to any serious difficulty from his connection with his new Allies."

X.—(1) Turki murdered by Meshari. (2) Meshari executed by Feysal. (3) Feysal assumes the kingdom, 1834.

40. But the difficulty in which the Imam and we as his allies were involved was almost immediately solved by the occurrence of events in Nejd, which effectually diverted the Wahabis from schemes of foreign invasion. Turki in 1834 was assassinated by his nephew Meshari, and the murderer usurped the government.



41. This usurpation, however, was shortlived ; it lasted only until Turki's son Feysal, who at the time was conducting military operations near Katif in Hasa, could return to Riyadh. Meshari was then executed, and Feysal succeeded his father as Sultan of Nejd.

42. Feysal was about 34 years of age. He at once applied himself to restore order in the central provinces, where recent events had thrown everything into confusion.

XI.—(1) Second Egyptian invasion. (2) British pressure compels the Egyptians to withdraw, 1836—1840.

43. Very small leisure however was allowed him for this task. In 1836 a large Egyptian force was assembled at Medina, and Feysal was summoned as a vassal to bring in a contingent of troops to the Egyptian General. Feysal evaded this demand ; but when he found the following year that the pretensions of a rival Prince, his cousin Khalid, were about to be forcibly taken up by the Egyptians, he made a tender of full submission. It was too late. The Egyptian General, with the pretender Khalid in his wake, advanced into Nejd and after a battle near Riyadh became master of the country. In December 1838 Hasa and Katif were added to the Egyptian conquests, and Feysal, having surrendered himself to Khurshed Pasha, was sent a prisoner to Egypt. Khurshed Pasha now threw off the cloak afforded by Khalid's claims to the throne, and declared Nejd an appanage of Egypt.

44. The Foreign Office has some bulky records of this period relating to affairs in Arabia, but there is little in them of value with reference to the purposes of this Précis. For the Wahabis had now been swallowed up by the Egyptian power, and therefore not only was the attention of the Indian Government concentrated on the Egyptians only, but its policy became coloured by exclusively European considerations. Lord Palmerston was at that time triumphantly carrying through, in the teeth of France as administered by M. Thiers, his determination to reduce Mahomed Ali, the too powerful Pasha of Egypt, to a proper subordination as vassal of the Porte.

45. Instead therefore of viewing the downfall of Wahabi fanaticism and the rise of semi-civilised Egypt in its stead with any of that indifference or complacency which, if the event could be repeated, might now perhaps be felt, the Indian Government omitted no effort of diplomacy to counteract the progress of the Egyptian Generals. The Resident in the Persian Gulf entered a formal protest against the proceedings of Khurshed Pasha, and took written engagements from the maritime Chiefs of Oman that they would sedulously cultivate their relations with the British Government, abide by its wishes and instructions, and above all resist to the last extremity all attempts of Khurshed Pasha to subjugate them. It was even seriously in contemplation to blockade the Arabian ports in the Persian Gulf held by Egyptian troops, when at last the strong remonstrances addressed to Mahomed Ali by Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Cairo were found to have had their effect, and in May 1840 the Egyptians evacuated Nejd. The Amir Khalid, however, was left behind as Vali of the province.

XII.—Government of Khalid as Turkish Vicegerent, 1840—41.

46. It is noticeable that Khalid accepted this office by direct appointment from the Sublime Porte ; for it was at this juncture and in this way that the Turkish Government first came forward as claimant to all the rights of sovereignty in Central Arabia acquired by the conquests of its Lieutenant, Mahomed Ali, and his Egyptian troops. In allowing this arrangement Khurshed Pasha seems to have intended that Khalid's Government should be carried on under control from an Egyptian Agent to be established at Medina.

47. Khalid's short rule is marked by two occasions of contact with the British Government. In the first instance, he addressed a very friendly letter to the British Native Agent at Bahrein, expressing an earnest desire to renew the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his great-grandfather, Saud, and the British Government, hinting that he had wished before to open the correspondence, but had been prevented by his Egyptian



masters. And secondly, in October 1841 a report having arisen that he contemplated the invasion of Oman, a British Officer was deputed to visit him at his camp in Hasa, seventy miles from the coast, who obtained from him an assurance that he had no such intention. Indeed, Khalid had no power to meditate foreign invasion. Deprived of the Egyptians, he was quite unable to hold his own in Nejd.

XIII.—Abdullah-bin-Suneyan seizes the kingdom. Feysal returns from exile, 1842.

48. Abdullah-bin-Suneyan or Thaneyyan, a distant cousin of Khalid, entering the lists against him, after a short and uneventful contest succeeded in wresting his power from him, and becoming fully acknowledged as Ruler of the Wahabis. This happened in February 1842.

49. The new Ruler had been just a year installed in authority, when Feysal re-appeared in Arabia having somehow effected an escape or a release from Egyptian captivity. The Nejdians flocked to the standard of the rightful Prince, and in June 1843 Abdullah-bin-Suneyan was forced to surrender at discretion.

XIV.—(1) Oman threatened. (2) British Policy, 1843—1845.

50. In July 1843 Feysal sent a messenger with letters to the maritime and inland Sheikhs of Oman, intimating his intention of sending an army under Syud-bin-Mutluk, on the termination of the hot weather, for the purpose of bringing that province under his authority. In consequence of this threat the Chiefs of the inland fort of Beraymi applied for the aid of the British Government.

"They were informed, in reply, that the communications formerly entered into with them by the British Government had reference solely to the advance of the Egyptian troops, and the connection subsisting between His Highness Mohammed Ali Pasha with Nejd; but that these circumstances being now altogether changed, and the impending danger removed by the departure of the troops under Khurshed Pasha from that province, it was now the intention of the British Government to withdraw from all interference in the internal affairs of Arabia."

51. At this very time too the Resident received a communication from the Amir himself expressive of a desire for the renewal of the amicable relations which

Feysal's pacific overtures.

had existed between his father, Turki, and the British Government. Proper response was made to this demonstration of amity, and the Amir was further informed that the sole object of the British Government in this quarter was the suppression of plunder and bloodshed on the seas, and the security of all well-disposed inhabitants on the shores of the Gulf.

52. In September 1843 the Bombay Government (at that time headed by Sir George Arthur) enquired of the Government of India what policy should

British view of his proceedings.

be pursued towards Feysal. The Bombay Government considered that as long as the Chief remained within his former possessions no interference would be necessary, but it nevertheless doubted whether he should be allowed to obtain a preponderating influence at Bahrein and with the Arab Chiefs who were under treaty engagements to us. To this reference the Governor General (Lord Ellenborough) in Council replied simply that it was "not at present necessary or expedient to interfere with the proceedings of the Chief."

53. In December the same year Amir Feysal interposed in a quarrel between two rival claimants for the Chiefship of Bahrein, and having secured the


Wahabi interference at Bahrein.

victory for his own *protégé*, appropriated the fort of Demaum as the reward of his assistance.

54. On the 26th August 1844 the Bombay Government renewed its enquiry "as to the policy which should be

British Policy.

pursued in the now certain event of Amir Feysal, the legitimate Wahabi Ruler, extending his authority over the Chiefs of Oman, and especially if he endeavoured to effect this object by sea."



It was pointed out that Feysal's proceedings might ultimately endanger our relations with Oman and the maritime Arab Chiefs, and so tend to resumption of piracy. And the letter concluded as follows :—

"It does not therefore appear to the Governor in Council unworthy of consideration whether the Resident in the Persian Gulf should not at once endeavour to effect an arrangement with Amir Faysal, ratifying and securing existing engagements at sea. In other words, that, as the price of forbearance on the part of the British Government, this Chief should become a party to its maritime engagements, whereby commercial interests may be secured.

"As the not improbable event of the Wahabi Ruler encroaching on the possessions of His Highness the Imam of Maskat, an old ally of the British Government, is a contingency which ought to be provided for, this Government is desirous of being favoured with the sentiments of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council on this point."

55. No official reply was issued to this application, but the view adopted by the Government of India was evidently that suggested in Lord Hardinge's brief remark on the back of the letter, *viz.*—"No case for interference has arisen."

56. Early in the year 1845 Syud-bin-Mutluk came to Beraymi from Nejd and at once all the neighbouring Arab tribes, inspired perhaps as much by fear of Wahabi arms as sympathy with Wahabi tents, vied with each other in tendering their allegiance to Feysal's representative. Elated with greater success than he had expected, Syud-bin-Mutluk ravaged the territories of the Sohar Chief, seized the fort of Muejes, butchering all its garrison, and compelled the Chief to consent to a very heavy tribute. He at the same time demanded a large tribute from Maskat, and was preparing to enforce the request by invasion. At this juncture the Bombay Government again addressed the Government of India, enquiring what was to be done if the Imam asked for our help against the Wahabis. The Government of India replied on May 6th in the following terms :—

"It would appear that Feysal-bin-Turki, in whose name and on whose behalf the present expedition of Syud bin-Mutluk has been undertaken, has not hitherto done more than endeavour to re-establish the Wahabi supremacy as it existed in the time of his father, Turki-bin-Saud, before the Egyptian aggression reduced the Wahabi power, and that it is the opinion of Major Hennel that our interests with respect to the maritime Arabs are likely to suffer by Syud bin-Mutluk's proceedings.

If therefore the mere establishment of the Wahabi power in Oman and the reception of the willing allegiance of the maritime Chiefs whom on a former occasion we took under our protection and encouraged to resistance were to be the only result of the present expedition of Syud-bin-Awlik, the Governor General in Council would see no occasion to modify the opinion given in the letter from this office of 7th October 1843, that our interference is not called for; but if it appear to be the purpose of Feysal-bin-Turki to extend the Wahabi supremacy beyond former limits and to encroach upon the possessions of our ally, the Imam of Ma-kat, or if the result of these proceedings are found detrimental to our relations with the maritime Arabs and our measures for the suppression of piracy, a case for our interference will, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, arise, and it may be perhaps desirable in such case for you to instruct the local authorities to declare to Fuyssal-bin-Turki that our forbearance, from which he may have hitherto taken some encouragement, will be extended no further, and that we cannot countenance or allow wanton aggression on the territories of our ancient ally.

The Governor General in Council is disposed to think that the explicit expression of our feelings on this subject will be sufficient to cause the Wahati Chief to desist from active operations, should they be contemplated, against the Maskat district, or that, at any rate, a demonstration by sea by the force now in the Gulf will produce the desired effect. On this subject the local Government of Bombay will be better able to form a judgment than the Governor General in Council.

The Governor General in Council, however, wishes it to be understood that he would not, on the one hand, commit the Government at the present moment to a line of policy which would be likely to involve the necessity of detaching troops to the Gulf, nor would he, on the other, make to the Wahabi Chief or his agent Syud-bin-Mutluk a threat which he would not be prepared fully to carry out.

If therefore the Bombay Government consider that a mere declaration of our views or naval operations alone will in all probability effect what is desired, the Governor General in Council authorizes the Bombay Government to instruct the local authorities accordingly; but if on this subject His Honor in Council entertains doubt, he is requested to refer to us again with a full exposition of the views and opinions of the Bombay Government for the further instructions of the Government of India."



57. As a result apparently of this correspondence, the Indian Navy made a strong demonstration off the Batina Coast, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf addressed forcible remonstrances both to Feysal at Riadh and to his Lieutenant at Beraymi. These measures proved successful; satisfactory replies were received from the Wahabis, and the storm blew over. The Maskat Government agreed to pay Feysal an annual tribute of 5,000 crowns; 2,000 crowns were also given as a present to Syud-bin-Mutluk, and for these considerations the Wahabis evacuated the fort of Mujees and retired. Beraymi still remained in Wahabi occupation, but Syud-bin-Mutluk's popularity among the neighbouring Arabs was short-lived, and his position there became frequently one of danger.

XV.—Wahabi attempt on Bahrein, 1847—1851.

58. During the seven years succeeding the events just noticed, the only instances of Wahabi aggression in the direction of the Persian Gulf appear to be two displays of pressure on the Chief of Bahrein, the first in 1847, and the second in 1851. On the latter occasion the Resident in the Persian Gulf acting upon what he believed to be the wish of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, despatched the entire Persian Gulf Squadron to Bahrein with instructions to interfere forcibly, if necessary. And the step was a salutary one, for without it Bahrein would certainly have fallen into Feysal's grasp: as it was, Feysal found himself obliged to make peace with the Chief. It seems too as if from this time forward Feysal adopted a much more conciliatory tone in the not unfrequent communications that followed between himself and the Resident.

59. A letter of this period from the Resident is of some interest as showing the designs upon Arabia then entertained by either the Ottoman Porte or, as is more probable, Abbas Pasha, the half-crazy debauchee who succeeded Mahomed Ali in Egypt. Colonel Hennell speaks of the probable acquisition of Bahrein by the Wahabis as being tantamount to its acquisition by the Porte, and justifies this assertion by the following considerations:—the Amir pays a regular tribute to the Turkish Government; there are accredited envoys from Abbas Pasha in the Amir's camp; the Wahabi Agent at Koweit (a Turkish port) passes himself off as an envoy from the Pasha of Egypt; there are Turkish emissaries along the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf; and Turkish steamers are in course of equipment for service in the Gulf.

XVI.—Invasion of Oman by Abdulla'h son of Feysal—Treaty between Maskat and the Wahabis, 1852—1853.

60. In 1852 during the absence of the Imam of Maskat in his African possessions, and while his incompetent son, Syud Thoweyni (the present Imam), was conducting the Government of Maskat, the Wahabis once more appeared in threatening force on the frontier. The time was well chosen; for there were disturbances and dissensions throughout all the Maskat territory, especially in Batinah, where the Imam had recently seized the Chiefship of Sohar under circumstances of singular treachery. The Wahabi leader, who this time was Feysal's son and heir-apparent, Abdullah, "came in the character of arbiter and redresser of wrongs suffered by his children (the Sheikhs) in Oman. He took up his position at Beraymi and summoned the Chiefs to attend him." As on the former occasion, the Arab tribes flocked to pay him their allegiance and offer service. Abdullah at once "sent forth demands for the immediate cession of Sohar and the payment of tribute so large in amount that it was plain he sought but a pretext, in the refusal that must of necessity follow, to attack and lay waste the districts of Batinah." The state of Maskat was indeed in imminent peril. But now the British Resident appeared on the scene, and by dint of calling the Joasmi Chief sharply to order, remonstrating with Abdullah, and sending a vessel of war to cruise along the Arabian Coast, he enabled Syud Thoweyni to enter into negotiations with the invader. The result was a Treaty of alliance offensive and defensive between the two parties, "whereby the Maskat Government agreed to pay to the Wahabi Amir an annual tribute



of 12,000 crowns, besides arrears to the extent of 60,000 crowns, and the usual supply of provisions and stores. The Wahabi likewise pledged himself to assist His Excellency in every hour of difficulty, and the boundaries of the dominions of either remained as heretofore."

XVII.—Feysal's nominal dependence on Turkey, 1855.

61. The next record of any interest is dated January 1855. The Resident having found it necessary to point out to Feysal that the British Government regarded the Arab tribes on the coast as independent powers, Feysal replied as follows:—

"With regard to what you observe that engagements have existed between the Chief of the coast of Oman and the Resident for a period of 30 years, this is well known to me, their object being to guard against the occurrence of irregularities and the harbouring of disorderly characters, nought else. This is an arrangement of which I quite approve on the part of Residents, both those who have gone before, and those who come after, for there is an understanding between us and the British Government of 100 years duration for the security of traders and travellers passing on the seas. The coasts of Oman, however, and the territories thereof appertain to the Peninsula of Arabia under my control, and acknowledging my authority. Further the people of the districts in the interior of Oman and at the seats of the Bedouin tribes are more powerful than, and have the command over the inhabitants of the coast and could not be restrained from preying upon and slaughtering them, but that I maintain a Lieutenant with a force in Oman, who holds them back from the people of the coast. These last are well assured of his protection; otherwise, were they abandoned to their fate, they could not subsist. Moreover, when owing to their negligence, disagreements, too long to be detailed, and bloodshed have arisen between some of the Chief's of the coasts aforesaid, there was none could check them and restore order and good will among them, except the Lieutenant in charge of Oman, whose office is among the things pleasing to God and his Prophet, as also to the Sultan of the faithful—may God strengthen the faith by his means. Being a dependant of the exalted Turkish Government, I hold the confirmation of the Sultan to my continuance in authority over all the Arabs. To exemplify this, when Mahomed Ali Pasha, having projected his schemes against Basrah and Mohammerah and the territory pertaining thereto, entertaining designs upon India, deputed his envoy to me, proposing to hold me dearer and more cherished than his own sons, to induce me to forward his views with respect to the coast of Oman and elsewhere within the Peninsula of Arabia, and to offer no hindrance or opposition—for of others, besides the Arabs, he took no account owing to his exalted dignity—I replied, 'you know that I am a dependant of the Sultan of the Faithful from whom if you possess orders to that effect let me be informed of them; otherwise the thing is impossible.' Thereon war broke out between me and him, which lasted two years, and intelligence thereof duly reached the Sublime Porte, and they (the Sultan's Government) greatly rejoiced, and were much pleased with me and my influence and consideration with them increased exceedingly. May God perpetuate their rule and the glory of their State."

62. In writing in this strain Feysal's object apparently was twofold; first to put forward a general claim to lordship over the whole of Arabia; and second, to try whether the affectation of being only the Vicegerent of a European Power might serve to divert the British Government from interference between himself and the maritime Arabs whom he asserted to be his feudatories.

XVIII.—Renewal of Wahabi attempt on Bahrein—British interference, 1859—1861.

63. After a silence of nearly five years our records resume mention of the Wahabis. Feysal this time re-appears in his old character as partisan of the refugee Sheikh of Bahrein (Mahomed bin Abdullah) against the *de facto* Chief (Mahomed bin Khalifa) with the design of appropriating Bahrein to himself. Notwithstanding repeated warnings from the Resident, and solemn assurances of pacific intentions from Feysal, in defiance even of the presence of a British corvette, extensive preparations for the invasion of Bahrein were made at Katif and Damaum, including the piratical seizure of some Turkish and Persian vessels and the impressment of their crews for service in the projected expedition. Hereupon Commodore Balfour with the Persian Gulf Squadron was despatched to the scene of action, and the very threatening attitude assumed by this officer soon induced the Wahabi Governor of Katif to abandon his designs, and humbly sue for pardon. In reporting the Commodore's success, the Resident expressed an opinion that we had borne too long with Feysal, who, while giving us fair words, still falsified all he said



by steadily pursuing his fixed object of universal dominion along the coast. He recommended direct reprisals upon the ports from which the recent piracies had been effected; "the pirates," he added, "of the Eastern Archipelago, of Tunis, Algiers, of Riff, and Salee have all had their visitation, and a humane Government has ever questioned the legality of such reprisals." There was some correspondence on this occasion between Feysal and the Resident. Feysal, after justifying his proceedings on the ground that the Sheikh of Bahrein was one of his own feudatories whom for various misdeeds he had a perfect right to chastise, protested against British interference in the following terms:—"Between the Wahabi Amir and the British Government Treaties have been made by the several authorities, authority after authority; and, in accordance with treaties between the Wahabi Amir and the Sultan Abdul Mejid, there are matters which every one is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds." To this the Resident replied by declaring that the British Government recognised Bahrein as an independent Chiefship and was prepared to oppose all foreign agency, including that of His Highness the Amir, by every means in its power; he also pointed out the inconsistency of Feysal claiming to be dependent upon Turkey at the same time that Feysal's Lieutenant at Katif was committing piracy on vessels bearing the Turkish flag. Upon receipt of the Resident's reports the Resolution adopted by the Government of Bombay and approved by the Government of India, was to insist on the expulsion of the refugee Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah from the Wahabi port of Damaum, where for 16 years his incessant intrigues for the recovery of Bahrein had been an element of disquietude extending over a considerable portion of the coast.

64. In June 1861 the Resident in compliance with the Government Resolution above mentioned wrote to Amir Feysal, requiring him to eject Mahomed bin Abdullah, the refugee Sheikh of Bahrein, from Damaum, and recommending him to enter into a peaceable convention with the Sheikh, whom by our recent treaty we had recognised as the rightful ruler of Bahrein.

65. Five months having elapsed without any reply from Feysal, the Resident in November 1861 again took the Squadron down to Bahrein, and after "an hour's firing, in which no casualty occurred on either side," compelled Mahomed bin Abdullah with all his faction to flee from Damaum. "From all I could learn," writes the Resident, "the Wahabi authorities and traders on their coast were inwardly pleased at the long pending question being thus settled, although His Highness the Amir could not, with due regard to Arab hospitality, openly compel Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah to relinquish the shelter he had offered him. In any case His Highness's castle and garrisons, both at Memaum and Katif, forbore to molest us in any way, and on our part orders were issued to respect them so long as they continued inactive.

XIX.—(1) Wahabis ports Attacked. (2) Blockade of Wahabi ports by the Chief of Bahrein. (3) Blockade raised on British interference, 1861.

66. The papers of 1861 show an exceptional state of affairs, the British Government this time interfering to protect not Bahrein from the Wahabis, but the Wahabis from Bahrein. The Sheikh seems somehow to have imbibed the idea that he could find better alliances for himself than that of England. First he hoisted the Turkish flag; then he threw himself into the hands of Persia; and finally, in reliance on Persian aid and a vague rumour of French vessels approaching, he proceeded to blockade the ports of his old enemy the Wahabis, harass the trade and pearl fisheries of Damaum and Katif, and enter upon a course of general piracy. These strange proceedings brought the Resident with the whole Gulf Squadron down to Bahrein; and in the end order was restored, and the Sheikh compelled to enter into a Treaty with the British Government. In this Treaty it was expressly declared that the Sheikh of Bahrein was an independent power.

XX—Turkish Protest against British proceedings, 1862.

67. These strong measures elicited a remonstrance from the Turkish Governor General of Baghdad. He wanted to know by what right we had



bombarded Demaum, a place which, as lying within the territory of "Feysal Beg, the Kaunmakam of Nejd," was "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan." To which Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad replied that we had hitherto "always maintained direct relations with Amir Feysal as well as with all the Chiefs and Principalities situated on the shores of the Persian Gulf"; that our pacific policy in the Gulf was well known, and that in the prosecution of that policy we "had never acknowledged the authority or jurisdiction of any other State—an authority and jurisdiction moreover which assuredly the Porte neither does exercise nor has ever exercised in that quarter." In reporting this correspondence to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople the Consul-General wrote as follows:—

"Although it may not be denied that, since the Egyptian invasion of Nejd in 1839-40, Amir Feysal has remained tributary to the Turkish authorities of Mecca, his tribute being regarded probably as an offering to the head of the religion, it is certain that the Porte has never exercised any jurisdiction, or attempted to extend its authority, over that country. Were it otherwise, were a Turkish administration established capable of controlling the province, restraining the Wahabis and their dependants from the piratical practices for which they were once so notorious, and finally of preventing or giving satisfaction for any breach of international law, such a state of things might be as conducive to good order, as it would be certainly less burdensome to the British Government than the maritime surveillance, which, in the interests of commerce, the British Government is now compelled to maintain in the Persian Gulf. But in point of fact, the Porte has not the power to punish or coerce its tributary; not a single Turkish functionary exists in the country; and to judge from my own experience of the duties of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, I feel assured that, were the relations of that officer with the Amir of Nejd to be disturbed in a manner to withdraw the Wahabi Coast from his immediate supervision, the effect must be highly prejudicial to the policy which has hitherto obtained under the orders and sanction of Her Majesty's Indian Government in that quarter."

68. In April 1862 the Resident reported that he was making another and a final effort to effect a peaceable settlement between Amir Feysal and the Chief of Bahrein, but that he much feared open war between the two parties was inevitable.

XXI.—(1) Differences between the Sultan of Maskat. (2) Amir of Nejd, 1864—1865.

69. Towards the close of 1864, the Chief of Rostack (whose family had been dispossessed of Sohar in 1849) displayed a hostile spirit towards the Sultan of Maskat and proposed to transfer his allegiance to the Wahabi Chief under certain conditions of tribute payment.

* Letter No. 277, dated the 3rd December 1864.
Colonel Disbrowe reported* to Government on the 3rd December 1864, that the Sultan had engaged in an expedition against this Chief, but that it had accomplished little, owing to the interference of one of the Wahabi Amir's lieutenants.

70. In another letter† written on the same day Colonel Disbrowe submitted an application from His Highness Syud Thoweyni, for a supply of ammunition, etc., and while pointing out that both the Maskat and Wahabi States were on terms of amity with the British Government, he observed:—


"Even when His Highness the Sultan of Maskat has been on unfriendly relations with Wahabi authorities, His Highness has always, during my service in the Persian Gulf, received the sympathies of the British Government through its representatives in the Gulf. Wahabi encroachments are essentially noxious and require discouragement."

71. Subsequently, the Sultan of Maskat addressed the Bombay Government confirming the intelligence which had already been communicated by Colonel Disbrowe, adding that he had written to the Wahabi Amir, and suggested that the differences which had arisen, in consequence of the proceedings of his Lieutenant Suderi, should be decided by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

72. Colonel Pelly being then on the Arab Coast was requested to report fully on the differences between the Sultan of Maskat and the Wahabi Chief, and to employ his good offices if mediation were of any use, but "to let the



"دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون
نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤". [١٤] (٦٨/٢٧)



Sultan clearly understand, that the British Government had no intention of interfering in the differences between the powers on the shores of the Persian Gulf, by aiding one party to coerce the other."

73. Colonel Pelly's enquiries* did not satisfy him that the Wahabi deputy was acting under instructions from his capital. He wrote:—

* Report to Government, dated 21st January 1865.

"It is more probable that the deputy saw a chance of interfering with Maskat, that he availed himself of this, and that when the matter came before the Amir, he watched events."

"Had the Sultan of Maskat consulted me before he acted, I would have advised him, first'y, to avoid, if possible, a struggle with the Wahabi power, and secondly, to postpone, using my name as an arbitrator until after I should communicate with the Wahabi Amir. His using my name is intended as a compliment, but in practice cannot but induce in the mind of the Wahabi Amir a presumption that my arbitrament may lean towards Maskat."

74. These views were concurred in by Government, and Colonel Pelly was requested† to avail himself of an opportunity of personally communicating

† Government letter No. 747, dated the 22nd March 1865.

with His Highness the Sultan on the subject. The Sultan was at the same

time informed by Government of the instructions which had been communicated to Colonel Pelly, with a view to placing his relations with the Wahabis on a more friendly basis.

XXII.—Visit of Colonel Pelly to Riadh, 1865.

75. On the 14th February 1865, Colonel Pelly announced to Government his intention of visiting the Amir of the Wahabis at his capital. Various reasons induced him to take this extraordinary step. He wrote:—

"I found that the name of the Wahabi Amir was always mentioned with a kind of respectful dread. The attitude of the Amir towards ourselves was considered hostile; or to use the words of Colonel Disbrowe, in his letter to your address, No. 277 of the 3rd December last, the sympathies of the British Government, through its representative in the Gulf, were with Maskat, while Wahabi encroachments were considered essentially noxious. A recent cause of ill-blood had been by our seizure of certain of the Wahabi craft. And when, after arrival in the Persian Gulf, I forwarded a friendly letter to the Amir, in view to an amicable interview, his reply was curtly repulsive, and couched in language which showed at once indignation and a sense of injustice at our line of policy."

"This was not a state of relations which could tend to the general peace and development of commerce in the regions of the Persian Gulf. And I therefore availed myself of a subsequent opportunity for again writing to the Amir in a polite spirit, giving him credit for the justice and sternness of his rule, and assuring him that he would always find me cordially willing to co-operate in maintaining the general peace and good order which he too seemed to have at heart."

"Sometime after the above occurrence, I learned from the proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, issued on the 24th of April 1864, that little seemed to be known of the interior of Arabia; that it was a desideratum to determine with scientific accuracy the geographical position of the Wahabi capital, and of some other points of interest; and that the Society were desirous of solving certain questions as to the identification of names of places, and as to the direction of the watershed."

"I confess, also, that when I found the Society recording that it was very difficult for 'Europeans' to enter Arabia on account of the 'extraordinary' jealousy of the population, and that to be known as a European traveller at any rate in the Wahabi country, that is to say in the central plateau of Arabia, would be exceedingly dangerous, possibly even fatal, I was unwilling that this should be supposed to be the case in regard to any Asiatic territory which might be adjacent to my jurisdiction, for it had been my habit to consider that an English Officer can go anywhere when his duty to the Government requires it."

"On the whole, it seemed advisable to land at Koweit, and thence visit the Amir at his capital, returning to the Persian Gulf by another route. Accordingly I am now on the march, and hope that I shall leave the Wahabi provinces on polite terms with the people, and with the prospect of more friendly relations with the Wahabi Government. It is possible, also, I may find an opportunity for a casual and friendly office towards smoothing the present differences between the Sultan of Maskat and the Wahabis."

76. Colonel Pelly appears to have successfully accomplished his journey to the Wahabi capital of Riadh. He returned to Bushire on the 25th March,



and informed Government by telegraph that his visit had been "satisfactorily concluded, and our relations are now quite friendly."

XXIII.—Differences between the Sultan of Maskat and Amir of Nejd, 1864-1865.

77. Colonel Pelly visited Maskat on his way to Bombay in April 1865. He elicited by his enquiries that the differences between the Maskat and Wahabi States had a two-fold aspect :—first, the rebellion of the hereditary Chief of Rostack, who had thrown off his allegiance to Maskat, and declared fealty to the Wahabi Amir; secondly, and principally a demand on the part of the Wahabi Amir for an increased rate of annual tribute from the Sultan, combined with a threat of invasion in case of non-compliance.

78. The Sultan of Maskat expressed his willingness to abide by any arrangement which Colonel Pelly might suggest. There was reason to fear that the quarrel had gone too far to render mediation of any effect, but it was clearly the only remedy which could be attempted. Colonel Pelly accordingly wrote to the Chief of Rostack, inviting him to Maskat under a guarantee of safe-conduct, with a view to an amicable discussion of differences. He also wrote to the Wahabi Amir, stating his readiness to afford good offices, and enclosed a letter from the Sultan of Maskat, in which the latter declared himself prepared to abide by whatever settlement the Resident might make.

79. The Chief of Rostack replied that the offer of mediation had come too late, he being already irretrievably committed to the Wahabis. No reply could be expected from the Wahabi Amir for some time, and it was altogether questionable whether he would assent to any amicable arrangement. "When I was at his capital" wrote Colonel Pelly "he spoke with contemptuous fierceness of the Sultan of Maskat, declaring that he was a drowning man, and that he the Amir would bring him to obedience by force."

80. If good offices failed it appeared to Colonel Pelly that a practical question would have to be met, *viz.*, "supposing Maskat and the Wahabi Power to go to war, what attitude would Government wish to assume thereto?" To this he answered that "in the abstract the true policy of Government in relation to all disputes among tribes in these regions appeared to be to let those tribes fight it out on shore, and for Government to limit itself to keeping the peace at sea;" but there were certain circumstances in regard to Maskat which Colonel Pelly thought it necessary to present for consideration:—

"Firstly, the second Article of the Maskat Treaty provides that, "the friend of that Sirkar is the friend of this, and the friend of this Sirkar is to be the friend of that Sirkar, and in the same way the enemy of this is to be the enemy of that."

"Secondly, only three or four years ago Government imposed on itself the task of arbitrating the internal dissensions of the Maskat State, and by their arbitration divided that State into two separate Sultanates, thereby essentially weakening it, as well by land as by sea."

"Thirdly, the Maskat State lying wholly on the sea-board, seems to be a description of State which suits our policy."

"Fourthly, Government have increasing telegraphic interests in Maskat territory; and if the Maskat Sultanate fell that portion of these territories in which those interests lie would become subject to Persian interference."

"If Government should wish to interfere they could do so, either by blockading the Wahabi ports or by remonstrance, whether to the Ottoman Government or direct to the Wahabi Amir."

"If Government should decide on remaining neutral, the question would arise as to whether any objection should be offered to the Sultan of Maskat disturbing the peace of the Persian Gulf by using whatever Naval means he may be able to collect for the purpose of blockading the Wahabi Ports? This is a question which would effect my own duty as Resident in the Persian Gulf. But both as I should be to see the peace of the Gulf disturbed by a Naval armament of an exterior Power, I cannot but admit that, under all the circumstances of the case, the Sultan of Maskat would, in my opinion, be justified, as a Maritime State, in retaliating an invasion of his land frontier, by a blockade of the enemy's coast line."



"دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون نجد، ١٨٠٤-١٩٠٤". [١٥و] (٦٨/٢٩)

81. In the views thus expressed by Colonel Pelly as to the course which our Treaty obligations and sound policy indicated, the Bombay Government generally concurred, but it seemed premature to decide on any definite course of action until the British had heard what the Wahabi Amir had to say. Meanwhile the officer in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf (Colonel Pelly having proceeded to Europe) and the Political Agent at Maskat, were informed that it was exceedingly desirable that these differences should be adjusted by their good offices without hostilities commencing between Maskat and the Wahabi Amir.

82. These proceedings having been reported to the Government of India, Mr. Secretary Muir replied on the 21st June 1865, that the Viceroy in Council "concurred in the views and approved the action of the Bombay Government."

XXIV.—Rebellion of two Oman tribes under leadership of a Wahabi officer. (2) Outrages on British subjects at Sur, 1865.

83. Shortly afterwards the Political Agent at Maskat brought to notice that a Wahabi Agent had arrived at that place with demands for the payment of three or four times the customary annual contribution, and that on his recommendation, His Highness Syud Thoweyni had sent a messenger with a letter to the Wahabi Amir, informing him that he had paid the usual annual contribution, but as regards additional demands he awaited the Amir's reply to Colonel Pelly's communication offering to mediate, and to the letter enclosed from himself (the Sultan).

84. This was followed by a letter from the Political Agent, dated the 22nd August, reporting that the Beni-bu-ali and Jennubah tribes had, under the leadership of Abdul Aziz Wahabi, invested the castle of Sur, and on the refusal of the garrison to surrender laid siege to it. Resistance was successfully offered by the Maskat troops for two days, but on the night of the third day the besiegers succeeded in undermining the walls of the bazar adjoining the castle, and effected an entry, when the entire wealth of the place, the greater part of which belonged to British Indian subjects, fell into their hands. During the assault one British subject was killed, whose remains were denied the rites of burial, and another was wounded. The castle subsequently surrendered. After suffering much hardship and indignity, and being stripped of nearly all their clothing, the British Indian subjects were permitted to leave Sur and proceed to Maskat. They represented their losses to the Political Agent at 27,000 dollars.

85. On receiving intelligence of these occurrences the Political Agent addressed the Sultan of Maskat, exhorting him to take "active and determined measures, tempered with clemency in its place and season," to bring the rebels to submission. He at the same time addressed the Wahabi Amir, and also his deputy Sudeyri at Brymi, protesting in the name of the British Government at the proceedings of their subordinate Abdul Aziz at Sur.

86. In forwarding to the Government of India a copy of the correspondence relating to these events, His Excellency the Governor in accordance with the request of the Governor-General in Council (previously* communicated) proceeded to record his views on the attitude proper to be observed by the British Government in the position of affairs in Oman.

87. After reviewing briefly the events connected with the rise of the Wahabi power, and its temporary subversion by Ibrahim Pasha, His Excellency wrote:—

"There can be no doubt that the Wahabis have of late shown a considerable revival of their former activity, both as an aggressive temporal power in the interior of Arabia, and as leaders of fanatical revival in India."

* Minute by His Excellency the Governor, concurred in by the Honorable Board, dated the 9th October 1865.



"There seems much ground for believing that the great increase, which has taken place during the last ten years, in the slave trade between East Africa and Arabia, is due to a new direction having been given to the naval enterprise of the tribes on the sea coast which were formerly most imbued with Wahabi fanaticism and most active in piracy.

"The visits of Mr. Palgrave and Colonel Pelly to the Wahabi capital have thrown great light upon the resources of this power, and the information recorded by these travellers shows very clearly that the Wahabis have of late years been recovering from the effects of the chastisement formerly inflicted on them, and that they are likely to become exceedingly troublesome to all in contact with them, who will not submit to their religious domination.

"A part from any internal impulse given by a revived spirit of religious fanaticism there are several obvious causes of the late development of Wahabi aggressive power in Arabia.

"Much is of course due to the natural effects of so many years of comparative rest in repairing their exhausted resources; something also no doubt to the disappearance of the generation which had experienced the power of the Egyptian Pasha, the late Imam of Maskat, and of British Naval and Military expeditionary forces.

"More however is probably owing to the sensible decay of vigour in the ruler of Maskat and to the comparative rarity of any visit from our vessels of war to the old pirate coast of the Persian Gulf.

"But whatever the cause, there can be no doubt of the evil effects of this revival of Wahabi power, and it is clear that these effects cannot be confined to the Continent of Arabia. We have had more than one warning symptom, during the past year or two of a possible revival of piracy on our own Indian Coasts. There is every year increased activity in the slave trade carried on between East Africa and Arabia, chiefly by vessels belonging to the Wahabi pirate ports, and the aggressions of the Wahabis by land on the territories of the Imam of Maskat, threaten seriously to injure a power which for several generations past has been the only representative of civilization and order in Eastern Arabia.

"I do not think that this is a state of things in which the British Government in India should be entirely passive. Our interest in the matter is not precisely the same as in 1821, when the pirates from the Wahabi coast threatened serious injury to the general trade of Bombay; but we have Treaty ties with the Imam of Maskat, and there can be no doubt that any considerable increase of Wahabi influence would lead to, at least, an attempt to revive piracy, and seriously impede the rapidly increasing commerce of the Persian Gulf. It might also at any time interfere with our telegraphic communication with Europe.

"The important question remains what it behoves the British Government to do under these circumstances?

"It seems quite clear that there is little chance of the Amir paying the slightest attention either to such friendly advice as Colonel Pelly gave him, or to the temperate remonstrances of Colonel Disbrowe.

"I would not for the present advise any renewal of an attempt on the part of our Political Agents to open a diplomatic correspondence with the Amir of the Wahabis. He is from his ignorance of our power not likely to pay the slightest attention to our wishes or remonstrances, and for the present any attempt to open further communication with him is only likely to embroil us further.

"I would instruct Colonel Disbrowe to adopt a somewhat different tone to His Highness the Imam of Maskat; to point out to His Highness clearly, but in temperate and friendly language, that the aggressions of the Wahabis are not likely to be checked by tame acquiescence, or by a constantly increasing addition of the tribute His Highness pays to them, that the Government of India will learn with regret, and surprise that its subjects have been murdered and plundered in a large town under His Highness' flag without any effectual attempt on His Highness' part to punish his own rebellious subjects, or to expel hostile invaders.

"I would point out to His Highness that the occasion is one which imperatively calls upon him to imitate the example of his illustrious father, to set his finances in order, to conciliate and revive the spirit of his feudatory tribes, to reorganize his military and naval forces, and to repel by force, if negotiation fail, the insolent aggressions of his Wahabi neighbours.

"I would not by any means lead him to lean on our aid in accomplishing these objects, but I would assure him of our intention scrupulously to fulfil our Treaty obligations, and of our desire to give him every reasonable support, not only moral but material, in any well-directed efforts he may make to re-establish his authority.

"There can be no doubt that His Highness' power, if properly exerted, is ample to effect all that is required. I would aid him with munitions, and, if absolutely necessary, with assistance in money, and with the presence of such ships of Her Majesty's naval forces in these Seas as the Commander-in-Chief may think best calculated to be of use in aiding the Imam to re-establish His Highness' authority in Sur or any other place on the seaboard, of which his rebellious subjects or the Wahabi enemy may have deprived him.



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"Colonel Pelly may be expected to return from his leave by the in-coming Mail, and I would propose to send him to Maskat in the first instance, before he proceeds to Bushire, with such instructions as the Governor General may approve.

"With this view these proceedings should be at once reported to the Governor General, and early instructions should be solicited."

88. In reply to the letter from the Bombay Government, submitting the foregoing Minute, the Government of India communicated on the 8th November 1865 the following telegraphic instructions from Sir Charles Wood:—"A telegram has been sent to the Senior Naval Officer at Bombay to comply with any request of yours. It may be advisable to beg the Senior Officer at Bombay to proceed to the Coast of Arabia, and in concert with the British Resident to take such measures instrumental they may think likely to promote an arrangement between the Wahabi Chief and the Imam. He is not, however, to undertake anything on land." In communicating these instructions, the Government of India desired that Colonel Pelly should impress on the Sultan of Maskat the necessity of vigorous action on his own part, and discourage any hope that the British Government would fight his battles for him.

XXV.—British Operations against the Wahabis, 1865—1866.

89. Colonel Pelly having meanwhile returned from Europe, he was furnished with the instructions received from the Government of India on the 14th November 1865 (the date of their receipt) and proceeded in the Steamer *Berenice* to the Persian Gulf, for the purpose of enquiring into the actual position of affairs in Oman so as better to enable him to act on the arrival of a man-of-war at Maskat. On the 28th November he met the Sultan at Barka, and found that he was fully alive to the necessity of vindicating his authority at Sur, and taking measures for the defence of this inland frontier, but that he was ill-prepared to do so from the weakness of his material resources. His great immediate want was money. Colonel Pelly strongly recommended that a loan of two lacs, at 5 per cent., should be granted to the Sultan, for which His Highness had offered the customs of the port of Gwador as security. He also recommended that two 18-pounder guns with ammunition should be supplied to aid the Sultan in his defensive operations. The Government of India, to whom these recommendations were submitted, approved the grant of the guns and ammunition, but observed that no sufficient reason had been adduced for the loan of the two lacs.

90. Meanwhile Amir Feysal had died (1865) and was succeeded by his son Abdullah. This news however reached our Political Officers in the Gulf in January 1866.

91. Before Colonel Pelly's arrival at Maskat the officer in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf, forwarded a communication purporting from the Wahabi Amir Feysal in reply to the representations which had been made to him regarding the mal-treatment of British subjects at Sur. The Amir while stating that he had ordered the release of the British subjects who had been taken prisoners by his lieutenant in the attack on Sur, and the restoration of their plundered property, was silent about making any reparation for the injury already done, and in regard to compensation for the man who had been killed on the occasion.

92. The Amir defended the proceedings of his lieutenant on the ground that there existed between the Wahabi Power and the British Government an Agreement originally effected in the time of the late Saud, and again ratified in the time of the present Ruler.

93. On this point the Assistant Resident at Bushire was requested by telegraph, to state whether there was any ground for the assertion of the Wahabi Chief—that any such specific or formal engagement existed between him and the British Government.



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94. Colonel Pelly was at the same time requested to enquire and report on the extent of mischief committed at Sur, and whether anything might reasonably be demanded on this account from the Wahabi Chief.

95. These proceedings were duly reported to the Government of India, and the Foreign Department at Calcutta was subsequently informed by telegraph, that no trace of any such Treaty as that mentioned by the Wahabi Chief could be found on the records of the Bombay Government or of the Bushire Residency. In reply, the Government of India after alluding to this fact, which a search in their own records had helped to confirm, observed:—

"It will be advisable for the Bombay Government to inform the Wahabi Amir that the British Government is not aware of the existence of any formal agreement between itself and the Amir; but that if any such document does exist, a copy of it, no doubt, must be in the Amir's possession, and the Amir will do well to produce it for verification.

"The Amir should be further given to understand that the Imaum of Maskat is our friend and ally, and the British Government while hoping for a happy settlement of any differences which there may now be between the Imaum and the Amir, cannot regard any encroachment on the Imaum's territory without grave concern.

"His Excellency in Council considers that it would be inexpedient to press the Wahabi Amir for compensation for any loss which British subjects may have incurred during the late hostilities."

96. Before these instructions reached Colonel Pelly's hands, events in the Persian Gulf rapidly assumed a momentous aspect arising from the determination of the Maskat Government to proceed to open hostilities with the Wahabis.

97. On the 21st December, Colonel Pelly re-visited the Sultan of Maskat and communicated to His Highness the offer of Government to aid him in guns and ammunition. He had entered on preparations for blockading the Wahabi ports of Khatif and Ojair, having received solemn assurances from the Bahrein authorities that they would co-operate with him. It was arranged that Syud Turki, who had recently given unequivocal proofs of fidelity and attachment to his brother the Sultan's cause, should proceed with the Maskat fleet to Bahrein in view to carry out the contemplated blockade.

98. Colonel Pelly being desirous of examining the state of affairs on the Arab Coast proceeded to Bahrein with the Sultan's ships, and en route communicated with the Chiefs of the Pirate Coast, reminding them of the aggressive policy of the Wahabis, and stating that the English Government would not object to their aiding the Sultan by land. During this time the Sultan was engaged in collecting his tribes, and equipping them for an advance towards Beraymi, a strategic point of great importance—threatening the Maskat territories and the Pirate Coast.

99. The Wahabis were not indifferent to these warlike preparations. They had a short time before moved a detachment upon the port of Saham, only a few hours distance from Sohar itself, and driven the Bunnya residents into the sea, one of whom perished by drowning. "It is remarkable" wrote Colonel Pelly "that at the very time this raid had taken place the Sultan was under the impression that the Wahabi leader was concealing himself. One noticeable feature of these incursions is that those among the invaders who are *bona fide* Wahabis of Nejd seem to be comparatively few. They are rather the leaders of frontier tribes on the borders of Oman itself."

100. Commodore Montresor concentrated his Squadron at Bombay early in December 1865, in pursuance of instructions from the Lords of the Admiralty "that he should comply with any requisition he might receive from the Governor General." On the 22nd December, H. M. S. *Highflyer* commanded by Captain Pasley having embarked the guns intended for the Sultan of Maskat



sailed for the Persian Gulf, visiting Maskat and Sohar *en route*, and delivering the guns and ammunition to one of the Sultan's ships at the latter port. On the 3rd January, the *Highflyer* called at Elphinstone inlet and found that Colonel Pelly had left for Sohar to which place Captain Pasley accordingly returned. At his first interview with Colonel Pelly he requested him to state in writing what were his views in regard to the Maskat and Wahabi disturbances. Colonel Pelly replied:—

"I understand that Her Majesty's Government will not do anything by land to aid the Sultan of Maskat, but that they are prepared to aid him on the seaboard by the presence of a man-of-war.

"The only points where the Wahabis can be touched from seaward are their ports of Ojair and Khatif with the intermediate Island Fortification of Demaum, commanding the entrance to Khatif, and so far as my unprofessional eye can see the only method by which a ship of war can aid the Sultan in his present crisis is by blockading the Wahabi ports until the Wahabi government comes to terms.

"Complicated with the Wahabi invasion is the butchery of one British Indian subject, and the plunder of ten or more others at the port of Sur, on the Maskat coast, by the Wahabi troops. If you blockade, the arrangements of this matter might be included in the general settlement; if you do not blockade, it would be for you to give to this matter such consideration as you may deem fit, and may be enabled to, under the orders* you have received from the Commodore.

*The orders furnished to Captain Pasley by the Commodore enjoined him to assist the Resident at Maskat, should he require *in writing*, even so far as to use coercive means, in aid of our ally the Imam, but he was clearly to understand that he was not to undertake any thing on land.

"In either case I shall be happy to hand to you a letter calling on the Wahabi government to apologize and make adequate reparation for that insult.

"The letter would require seven days for its transmission to the Wahabi capital from the date of its delivery to the Wahabi authorities at Khatif, three days more might be granted for the consideration of the letter by the Wahabi government, and seven days more for the return courier, in all seventeen days before commencing operations.

"If you determine to blockade, it would be necessary for me to give the usual warning. It will probably be obvious to you that it would not be advisable for the English Government to begin any operations which it might not be convenient to carry to a conclusion, to act otherwise would be to confirm the impression already so prevalent of our own absence of Naval power, and would be to leave our ally the Sultan more than ever liable to Wahabi aggression."

101. Captain Pasley rejoined:—

"I perfectly agree with you that it would be injudicious to commence any hostile operations which it might not be convenient for the Government to carry out, and as the *Highflyer's* time is limited in the Persian Gulf, and as I have no reason to suppose any other vessel of war is coming to take my place, I cannot recommend the establishment of a blockade which would not be enforced after the departure of the *Highflyer*.

With regard to the injuries inflicted on British subjects by the Wahabis at Sur, I shall be very happy to convey your letter, demanding an apology and reparation for that insult to the Sheikh of Khatif, for conveyance to the Wahabi Chief, and as the answer will be seventeen days returning to Khatif, I propose to visit the different ports on the Pirate Coast, returning to Khatif on the 27th or 28th instant, when I hope to hear from you.

"Should the answer from the Wahabi Chief be unfavorable, I shall be happy to assist you in confiscating the shipping in the port of Khatif, or by destroying his ports or otherwise as you may direct."

102. In accordance with Captain Pasley's views, Colonel Pelly handed him on the 6th January, a letter to the address of the Wahabi Chief, with one to the Governor of Khatif, and placed at his disposal the services of "the Native Agent for the Arabian Coast," whom Colonel Pelly described "as the best man for this work in Gulf."

103. The following is a translation of the letter addressed to the Wahabi Chief:—

"Your Highness has invaded the territories of Maskat, an independent State, in alliance with the British Government. About nine months ago the British Government permitted me to use my good offices as mediator between you and the Sultan of Maskat. I addressed a polite letter to you on this subject, your Highness did not acknowledge that letter, on the contrary your troops have since butchered one British Indian subject, and plundered ten others of all they possessed.



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"These subjects were imprisoned, deprived of food and water, and were ordered to pay a ransom in 100 dollars each. These British Indian subjects were not even allowed to dispose of their murdered companion's corpse. These British Indian subjects thus killed or plundered were peacefully residing in the port of Sur, in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat.

"I have now to request that your Highness first send to me on board H. M's. S. *Highflyer* lying between Demaum and Bahrein, a full and written apology for the wanton outrages on the part of your dependents.

"2ndly. That the messenger who brings that apology shall bring with him also the sum of 27,700 dollars being the amount ascertained to have been plundered from the said British Indian subjects."

"3rdly. That your Highness give at the same time solemn written assurances that no similar outrages and butchery shall in future take place."

"This letter will be handed to your Highness's Governor of Khatif, who will be requested to pass a receipt for the same, and seventeen days will be allowed for the letter to reach your Highness, and for your Highness to return a reply.

"If at the expiration of seventeen days the required satisfaction is not given by your Highness, the British ships of war will destroy the forts on your seaboard, and confiscate your Highness's craft there lying.

"Only this moment it has come to my knowledge that your Highness's troops have attacked the fort of Shaim in the Maskat territories, and driven the British Indian subjects there residing into the sea. One of these has perished in the surf, the others have come on board to complain."

104. The *Highflyer* left Sohar on the same day and anchored in the outer harbour of Bahrein on the 13th January, to enable the Native Agent to visit Khatif and deliver the letter for the Amir of the Wahabis. This duty accomplished, the *Highflyer* sailed on the 13th to Abu-Thabe, and then cruised along the Pirate Coast, calling at the principal ports in her course. On arrival at Ajman, Captain Pasley in compliance with a suggestion communicated to him by the Resident before he left Sohar, proceeded to destroy a Wahabi tower which dominated that part of the coast. This operation was judiciously carried out by Captain Pasley without any loss of life to the garrison. On the 23rd January, the *Highflyer* anchored at Elphinstone inlet, which Colonel Pelly had named as a rendezvous. A conference was held on the 25th by the Resident and Captain Pasley, when it was explained by Colonel Pelly that he was unable to accompany the *Highflyer* in the Residency steamer to Khatif, as the state of affairs at Bereymi, Bunder Abbas and Sur, required his presence near the Sultan. He added a request that Captain Pasley would, if practicable, destroy two Wahabi war-buggalows which were said to be in the creeks near Khatif.

105. The *Highflyer* left Elphinstone inlet on the 28th January, and Captain Pasley's subsequent proceedings will be best described in his own words:—

"I arrived off Khatif on the 30th, and on the Native Agent's return from the town, he told me there was no answer from the Chief of the Wahabis; that the Sheikh (or Governor of Khatif) said he had no money for me, and requested me to wait twelve days, and he would be sent to Head-Quarters for an answer.

"On the 2nd, I sent the boats armed to Khatif, in charge of Lieutenant Fellowes, with orders to bring out all the Wahabi Dhows that might be in the harbour, and to destroy the two war-buggalows and a small fort called Burj Builif which commands the boat channel to Khatif, which service he accomplished satisfactorily, but there being only one Wahabi Dhow in the harbour, and she not being worth removing, she was destroyed.

"On the 3rd February, I sent the boats in charge of Lieutenant Long, with orders to destroy, if possible, the fort of Demaum which is said to command the boat channel to Khatif, it being a little past high water, he was unable to get the boom boats near enough to be of use; he, therefore, took the cutters, with as many men as they could hold from the *Launce* and *Pinnace*, and materials for blowing up the tower: he, however, could not get within 200 yards of the beach, when he waded on shore and succeeded in effecting an entrance to the tower, but finding the garrison much stronger than he anticipated, (the Native Agent having told me twelve men) and being unable to gain the inner wall, he was obliged to retreat with, I regret to say, the loss of three men killed, and two officers, and three men wounded. I enclose a copy of Lieutenant Long's report.



"On the 4th, I sent the boats in charge of Lieutenant Long to shell the fort of Demaum at high-water, and, if possible, breach the wall, but the water was so shallow he was unable to approach near enough to do so, he, however, must have done considerable damage to the interior of the fort and its defenders."

106. The *Highflyer* rejoined the Resident at Maskat on the 9th February, and on receiving Captain Pasley's report of the operations before Demaum, it appeared to Colonel Pelly more than ever necessary that a prompt and severe example should be made of those Arabs (of the Jenebah tribe) who were implicated with the Wahabis in the plunder and murder of our subjects at Sur. There were other reasons too which called for the punishment of the Jenebah. They had long been notorious among our Naval Officers as the most cruel and unscrupulous slavers and pirates. They were among the Arab slave-dealers who had conspired in 1861 to assassinate the British Agent at Zanzibar for his anti-slavery proceedings. It was also believed that they were concerned in the murder of three seamen of H. M.'s *S. Wasp* who had disappeared in one of their craft a few months before. The Sultan of Maskat was assured of their criminality and had himself proceeded to Sur five or six months previously with the intention of punishing them, but he was suddenly obliged to return to Maskat owing to the detection of a conspiracy to dethrone him. Colonel Pelly had also in the preceding month sent the *Berenice* to Sur with a letter addressed to the heads of the Jenebah tribe, demanding from them the payment of 27,000 dollars as compensation for the property plundered by them from British subjects, and warning them that measures would be taken to enforce the demand if not speedily complied with. Their reply, however, was "that on a former occasion when Lieutenant Pengelly threatened a tribe on the Coast nothing was done, and that they were quite sure the Resident would not come now."

Letter to Government, No. 9, dated the 12th February 1866.

Matters were in this position wrote Colonel Pelly.

"When *Highflyer* arrived at Maskat on the 9th instant with a report of her repulse at Demaum, and then it seemed to me more than ever necessary to give a prompt and severe example with *Highflyer*. Accordingly I started at once with "*Berenice*" taking the Maskat Wazir with me, and on arrival at Sur sent the appended letter* to the tribe.

"*Highflyer* joined me on the morning of the 11th, and her fire was to open at noon; at 11 A.M. the Chiefs came aboard to me to ask for delay till the spring when their craft from Jeddah would return. At noon Captain Pasley fired a gun every half hour, thus giving a further caution to all non-combatants round the forts and shipping to clear out, and it was arranged with a neighbouring Chief that he might shelter these.

"At 1 P.M. Captain Pasley opened fire on the forts, utterly ruining them.

"At day break in the morning of the 12th *Highflyer's* boats went up the Sur creek in charge of Lieutenant Long and destroyed or confiscated every Suri craft; burning also a large quantity of ship-timber. Some of the tribe showed in the distance, but they were completely awed by the fire.

"I beg to append Captain Pasley's report of proceedings, in original, and beg to draw the attention of Government to the complete and skilful manner in which Captain Pasley and the officers and men under his command have inflicted this severe punishment on the Suri Jenebah tribe in their own creek and nest. This tribe number some six thousand fighting men, reputed the bravest and most cruel of littoral Arabs.

"Owing to a shift of wind during the operations, a small part of the temporary huts of the town caught fire, but this accident was wholly unavoidable, and no great damage is done to the Town.

"All non-combatants had cleared out before the attack."

107. The *Highflyer* returned to Bombay on the 18th February, bringing with her Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's despatches on which His Excellency the Governor recorded the following Minute†:—

†Minute by His Excellency the Governor, concurred in by the Honorable Board, dated the 24th February 1866.

"I think the acknowledgments of Government are due to Captain Pasley and the officers and men of the *Highflyer*, for the energy and ability with which all these operations were carried out."



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"These operations appear, with one partial exception, to have been most successful, and have, moreover, been executed with a care for the lives and property of non-combatants, which reflect great credit on Captain Pasley and all employed.

"While lamenting the loss of the brave men who were killed at Demaum, I would express our sincere admiration of the gallantry displayed by Lieutenant Long and the whole party engaged, and particularly of those who are named by their Commanding Officer, as worthy of special mention.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly is of opinion that it will be necessary to return to Demaum with the means of battering it from a raft.

"But before making any fresh attempt of the kind it will be well to ascertain from the Resident what has been the effect of the operations already carried out? It appears that after the expiration of the term fixed by Colonel Pelly in his demand on the Wahabis for satisfaction, several Wahabi war-buggalows and the tower of Burj Bullif, commanding one entrance to the harbour of Khatif, were destroyed, and the fort of Demaum itself was plied with shot, shell and rockets to an extent which must have made a considerable impression on the garrison, and probably removed any notion they may have entertained as to their power to resist any attack which might be made on it with an adequate force. It will be well to ascertain the total effect of all these operations before undertaking any thing further against the fort of Demaum which seems in itself to be of little importance.

"I would propose, therefore, to ask the Commodore to visit Maskat before the season for active operations in the Gulf draws to a close, taking with him any part of his squadron which can be spared from other service, and that he should confer with Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly, who will, by that time, have ascertained the general effect on the Wahabis and the littoral Arabs, of the whole series of operations, including those which may have been undertaken by His Highness the Imam by land. Should it appear that sufficient has been done for this season, no further operations against Khatif will be necessary, if otherwise, the Commodore will be in a position to decide what may be possible and necessary to secure, at least for the current season, the peace of the Maritime tribes of the Gulf, and the safety of the British subjects residing amongst them.

"Since Colonel Pelly wrote, he will have received the instructions of the Governor General in Council as contained in Mr. Secretary Muir's letter of the 24th January last, No. 66, which express the opinion of the Viceroy that it would be inexpedient to press the Wahabi Amir for compensation for any loss which British subjects may have incurred during the late hostilities between the Wahabis and the subjects of Maskat. Moreover, the damage inflicted on the Wahabis and Surees by the *Highflyer* in destroying their towers and war-buggalows will apparently at least equal the value of what our subjects were supposed to have lost.

"I would submit these remarks with Colonel Pelly's despatches to the Governor General in Council, and inform His Excellency that we propose requesting the Commodore to sail as soon as he considers expedient, and that we hold at his disposal, if he thinks they can be useful, the gun-boats or materials for a raft or any other munitions which the Dockyard may afford, and which he may think necessary for the use of our squadron or useful to our allies in further operations on the Arabian Coast. The Commodore's instructions from the Admiralty preclude his undertaking any hostile operations except under a written intimation of the Governor General's wishes.

"I do not, however, anticipate that it will be found possible or necessary to undertake further operations on the Pirate Coast this season.

"It may be well to note as our reason for not asking the Commodore to await at Bombay the reply of the Governor-General in Council, that the summer is I believe the time of Pearl-fishing, when the evil-disposed among the littoral Arabs are most apt to be troublesome, but our men-of-war cannot, without the most urgent necessity, undertake active operations in the Gulf at that season, and, therefore, if it should appear to be absolutely necessary to do anything for the protection of British subjects or property, before the warm weather sets in, there is no time to be lost.

"At Mussendom the Commodore will be able to learn the wishes of the Governor General in Council by telegram."

108. In a letter written to Government by Commodore Hillyar on receiving Captain Pasley's report of the proceedings of the *Highflyer* in the Gulf, he remarked on the apparent want of consideration shewn by the Resident in not proceeding himself to aid in a service which called for local knowledge and experience such as a Native Agent could not be well expected to supply. On this point the Governor in Council observed in reply:—

"Colonel Pelly was alone, with an European Political Officer or Assistant, and the necessity for his remaining to urge the Maskat authorities to efficient action had no doubt prevented him from going up the Gulf with the *Highflyer*. In deputing his Native Agent



he sent the only man at his disposal, who could be of any use, and he must have put himself to much inconvenience in dispensing with the Native Agent's attendance on himself at that particular moment."

109. These proceedings appeared to the Bombay Government to illustrate very forcibly a necessity which was not felt while the Indian Navy existed, and occasion was taken to submit to the Governor General in Council an expression of their views as to the best means of supplying this want by providing a class of officers possessing local experience to aid Her Majesty's Naval Forces when employed in the Persian Gulf, and other similar regions.

110. While these proceedings were under consideration a telegram, dated Mussendom, the 21st February, was received from Colonel Pelly, announcing the death of His Highness Syud Thoweyni. After the *Highflyer's* departure from the Gulf, Colonel Pelly remained at Mussendom in hourly expectation of intelligence that the Sultan had taken Beraymi when a boat arrived from Maskat with letters from the local Agent, and from Syud Saulem, the eldest son of the Sultan, informing him that Syud Thoweyni was dead, that Syud Saulem had succeeded, and that the latter desired to conduct his government under the Resident's counsel, and requested his presence at Maskat.

XXVI.—The Amir of Nejd comes to terms, 1866.

111. The murder of Syud Thoweyni in February 1866, frustrated the operations projected by him for the capture of Beraymi. On the other hand on Amir Feysal's death about October 1865, his successor Abdullah was anxious to make peace with the British. The spring of action of this move was probably his fear of his brother Saud's intrigues against his power. So we find him sending making offers of peace to the British Resident early in 1866. On 20th February the Resident telegraphed from Mussendom as follows:—

"I have just received the following letter dated 23th ultimo from the Wahabis Amir *begins* Your wish to mediate between us and the Ruler of Maskat, this mediation is approved by us, but if the arrangement come to us is not acted upon, the penalty should be exacted from the party not abiding by it. Reply what your decision may be, an agent will follow to make arrangements *ends*."

"Another letter from the Wahabi Amir in reply to my demands states that he desires a consultation and will send an agent; that the Genebah tribe are guilty in regard to our subjects at Sohar but that it is incumbent on him, the Amir, to try and recover the money."

112. Soon after the Amir dispatched an envoy to Bushire with definite proposals of peace. Measures were taken for the protection of British interests at Maskat during the confusion that ensued there after the late Sultan's murder.


113. Colonel Pelly arrived at Bushire on the 21st April, and had an interview with the Wahabi Envoy, whose assurances and wishes appeared to be in all respects satisfactory. He gave Colonel Pelly the following written declaration:—

"I Mahomed bin Abdullah bin Manch am certain on the following points:—

"I am authorized by Imam Abdullah bin Fysal to request the Sahib, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to become the medium of friendship between Imam Abdullah bin Fysal and the British Government.

"*Secondly*—I assure the Resident in the Persian Gulf on the part of Imam Abdullah bin Fysal that he will not oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under the authority of Abdullah bin Fysal and,

"*Thirdly*—I assure the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the part of Imam Abdullah bin Fysal, that he will not injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government, especially of the Kingdom of Maskat further than in receiving the Zakat that has been customary of old.



"Written by my hand at Bushire on Saturday the 5th day of Zilhajjeh 1882—21st day of April 1866."

114. The terms of this declaration were telegraphed to the Bombay Government by Colonel Pelly for approval, and on being communicated to the Foreign Office at Simla, the Government of India replied that they "agreed to Colonel Pelly coming to a friendly arrangement with the Wahabi Representative, provided that any payment from the Maskat Government shall be as arranged between that Government and the Wahabi, and not guaranteed by the British Government. "Colonel Pelly" it was added "can give his good offices in arranging the details of an agreement between the two parties subject to the above condition, but no Treaty between the British Government and the Wahabi Chief can be made without our seeing the full details, and without the sanction of the Home Government." Before this reply reached Colonel Pelly he again telegraphed:—"I am, I think, enabled to state that Government can dictate any consistent demands and relative positions they like, and that they will be accepted by both the Arab States, but it is on all accounts desirable that I should be favoured with definite instructions, as early as may be convenient." In answer to this intimation the Government of India referred to their previous reply, adding that "no definite instructions could be given, and that Colonel Pelly could make suggestions after consultation with the Wahabi Agent as he may think fit, which the Government of India will duly consider on hearing the opinion of the Bombay Government on the subject."

115. On receipt of these instructions Colonel Pelly had another interview with the Wahabi Envoy who signified that he "acceded in all respects to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and that if any difficulties should arise as to the tribute payment from Maskat, the Amir would solicit the good offices of the Resident." Colonel Pelly then handed to him a letter to the address of the Wahabi Chief, of which the following is a copy:—

"I have received your Highness' friendly letter by the hand of your confidential servant Mahomed bin Abdullah bin Mana and suite.

"You state that your desire is for peace, and your Envoy has handed to me a paper, copy of which I enclose, and which has been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

"If difficulties should hereafter arise as to the payment to be made to you by Maskat, the English Government do not wish to interfere or become guarantee in a matter which concerns you and the Sultan. But the English Government would not object to my using my good offices in arranging the details of an agreement, and your Envoy informs me that in the contingency of such question arising, you will write and request my good offices.

"In one of your previous letters you refer to the question of religion. The religion of the Wahabis lies between themselves, their Imam and their God, and the English Government have no wish to interfere therein.

"I hope this may find you in health, and if you have any difficulty send me a confidential Agent, and I shall always be happy to meet him on friendly terms as I have Mahomed bin Abdullah bin Mana."


116. In reporting to Government the result of his final interview with the Wahabi Envoy, Colonel Pelly wrote:—

"I asked the Wahabi Envoys what the Amir meant by stating in his letters that agreements had existed of old between his Government and the British. The Envoys replied that the Wahabi Amirs had, from time to time, received friendly letters from the British authorities, and that the Wahabi Government considers a friendly letter to be synonymous with a Treaty agreement."

"Before leaving, the Wahabi Envoys explained to me that the present Wahabi Amir had many enemies, and difficulties to contend with, and trusted that I would not credit reports that might be made to his prejudice. I replied, that I was well aware of the critical position of the Wahabi Government, and knew that it had powerful enemies, as well at home as on its frontier, and these difficulties appeared to me as supplying additional reasons for the Wahabi Government remaining peaceably within its own territories and consolidating itself. For the rest, if the Wahabi Amir desired any further communication, he could forward it in writing, when it would be duly transmitted by me to higher authority."

117. The Government of India expressed the following views on Colonel Pelly's report in their letter No. 602, dated 11th June 1866, to the Bombay Government:—

Political A., June 1866, No. 66.



"In reply, I am desired to intimate that the conciliatory spirit shown by the Wahabi Envoy is satisfactory. The Governor General in Council hopes that it will enable Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly to bring the differences between the Wahabi Ruler and the State of Muskat to a satisfactory conclusion.

With regard to our own causes of complaint against the Wahabis, His Excellency in Council authorises the Resident, after hearing all that can be said both on behalf of the British subjects injured at Sur, and also by the Wahabis in justification of their proceedings, to use his own discretion in coming to terms with the Envoy as to the amount of compensation that may be reasonably demanded.

But in both cases the Government of India entirely concurs with the Government of Bombay in discountenancing Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's suggestion that the interference of the Turkish Government should be invoked. No good, but much harm, would result from the question of Turkish supremacy over the Wahabi Territory being imported into our relations with the latter power. It has always been our policy (see* letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad, to our Ambassador at Constantinople, dated the 1st January 1862), to repudiate the Porte's claim to authority in that quarter; and the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that any deviation from the principle will give rise to complications much to be deprecated."

XXVII.—Deputation of a Wahabi Envoy to Baghdad, 1866.

118. While one Envoy was deputed by the Amir of Nejd to Colonel Pelly, another was sent by him to the Turkish Governor-General at Baghdad. The object of this latter deputation is explained in the letter of the British Consul at Baghdad (Colonel Kemball), No. 15, dated 18th April 1866:—


"I have the honour to report to your Excellency the arrival at Baghdad, on the 29th March, of Abdul Aziz es-Saweylim, Envoy from Amir Abdulla ibn Faysal-al-Saud, the Wahabi Ruler. His mission and its nature had been announced to me by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Basorah, but here he was for some time represented to be merely in charge of four Nejd horses to be presented to the Sultan; and in this character, ostensibly, I understand, Namik Pasha proposes that he should prosecute his journey to Constantinople.

"A few days ago, however, His Excellency intimated to me, through his confidential Secretary, that Abdul Aziz was also charged with a letter from his master complaining of the aggressions of the English upon the coasts of Nejd, and its dependencies, and soliciting Turkish intervention against their recurrence. At the same time His Excellency sent me the draft of a note which he proposed to address to me inviting me to telegraph to the Governor-General of India to suspend further hostile operations (rumoured) to be under contemplation until the subject of quarrel could be discussed between the two Governments; or, if this course were impracticable, asking my opinion as to the propriety of his despatching a telegram in his own name, in the same sense, to the Governor-General.

"In reply, I stated to His Excellency that Abdul Aziz not having done me the honour to advise me of his visit to Baghdad, I could, of course, form no judgment of the causes and grounds of his mission, but assumed it, as reported, to be devoid of political object; and that, with respect to the relations of his master with the Turkish Government, as my previous correspondence, with His Excellency had been duly submitted by me both to Your Lordship and to the British Indian Government, while, on the other hand, His Excellency had advanced no additional facts or arguments, even in the form of Amir Abdullah's letter, to support the position he had taken up, I did not consider myself justified, were such a step within my province, to act upon His Excellency's suggestion, nor could I see any advantage in himself pursuing a course so unusual."

119. In his letter No. 16, dated 7th May 1866, the Consul-General at Baghdad reported the result of the deputation. We shall quote the whole letter, which throws much side light upon Turkish aims against Arabia even as early as 1866:—

"The Wahabi Envoy, Abdul Aziz-es-Soweylim, in lieu of proceeding to Constantinople has been dismissed by Namik Pasha. He accordingly left Baghdad on the 3rd instant on his return to Nejd.



"This sudden change of the policy on the part of Namik Pasha was announced to me by His Excellency in person on the same day, when I could perceive that His Excellency's views and sentiments with respect to the alleged connection of the Wahabis with the Porte had undergone considerable modification; and whereas he before loudly asserted the rightful suzerainty of the Sultan over Nejd, he now spoke of that connection in terms of indifference, if not of aversion.

I am aware that His Excellency appeared by telegraph to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran through the Turkish Minister there to cause the suspension of operations against Katif.


"The ostensible ground of Abdul Aziz's dismissal was the inferiority of his rank for the conduct of so important a mission, but at the same time His Excellency admitted that the letters he had received from Amir Abdullah bin Feysul were ambiguously worded; and he enlarged upon the treacherous and ambitious character of that Chief, as well as upon the impracticability, as evinced by the failure of the Egyptians to maintain the occupation of the country, of enforcing an allegiance which, being professed under momentary pressure, would only be observed by him so long as it suited his purpose.

"The facts I conjecture to be that Amir Abdullah, when urged by the Authorities of Bussorah to be more explicit in his communications, not only evaded compliance, but signified his repudiation of Turkish supremacy by despatching Envoys to Bushire to treat directly with the British Resident; while, on the other hand, the Ottoman Ministry at Constantinople, so far from concurring in the views of Namik Pasha, has probably pointed out to His Excellency the inexpediency of extending to more remote tribes and principalities in Arabia that condition of quasi-dependence which is found only too onerous and embarrassing in the case of the Bedouin tribes, whose peculiar status within Turkish limits cannot be ignored.

"Other disquieting rumours, too, may, I think, have influenced Namik Pasha. Some time after the arrival of Abdul Aziz-es-Soweylim at Baghdad accounts were received that Amir Abdullah had himself appeared at Koweit at the head of a considerable force, variously stated at 5,000 and 10,000 men. He had, it seems, marched to Jebel Shammar in order to surprise two Bedouin tribes, the Dhefye and a branch of the Anezeh, deriving from (subsidized by) the Baghdad Government, who usually encamp at this season on the Nejd border, from whom during his father's lifetime the zekat, or tithe in token of submission, had been repeatedly claimed, and to punish whose depredations on Wahabi territory was the professed object of the expedition. It has not transpired in what manner the Montefig from Sukesh Shikhh became involved in the quarrel; but in his pursuit of the Dhefye, Amir Abdullah came into collision with a combined force of both of these tribes, whom according to the reports first received by Namik Pasha and myself, he defeated with great slaughter, capturing from them many horses and dromedaries. On the receipt of this intelligence His Excellency telegraphed to the Governor of Bussorah, desiring him to call upon Amir Abdullah, now halted near Koweit, to suspend further operations, deprecating hostilities between tribes subordinate to the same authority, and recommending the mutual restitution of plunder as the basis of accommodation; but since the departure of Amir Abdullah from Koweit on his return to Riad, His Excellency has professed to believe that the reports first received were ill founded, and he adduces the arrival of 10 Nejd horses and as many dromedaries, selected by the Montefig chief, Sheikh Fuhud, from the spoils of the Wahabis, for presentation to His Excellency, as proof of the victory gained by the Turkish tribes. I append a copy of a further report of the particulars of the affairs which I received from Mr. Johnston on yesterday evening. It is interesting as illustrating the normal condition of the Nejd Frontier."

XXVIII.—Wahabi advances on Beraymi, 1870—1871.

120. During the contest for power in Maskat, between Sayud Azan-bin-Gheis and Sayud Salim, Sideyri, the Wahabi Lieutenant of Beraymi, was pledged to the side of Syud Salim. He was murdered, however, by the Chief of Shargah on 7th April 1870. On his death the Naim tribe, who complained bitterly of oppression suffered at the hands of Sideyri, the late Wahabi Lieutenant, resolved in their minds how they could free themselves from the Wahabi yoke, and resorted to the expedient of inviting Azan to take possession of Beraymi. Azan and his adviser Khuleli not being the men to allow the grass to grow under feet, the offer of the Naim was accepted. The proceedings of Azan were most probably hastened by a peremptory demand made on him by the Wahabis for payment of tribute. At any rate, the result was that Azan marched on Beraymi with about 1,500 men, and took it on the 18th of June after a very slight resistance.



121. On 2nd August Colonel Disbrowe wrote:—"So far as I can see and judge, Beraymi was gratuitously and unjustly invaded by Syud Azan and Azan must look for Wahabi retaliation."

As was anticipated by Colonel Disbrowe, the Wahabis soon took steps to retaliate.

122. On 29th January 1870 the Bombay Government telegraphed:—

"The Gulf mail just in leaves little room for doubting that the Wahabis are actually on the march for Baraymi. It seems also that they have prepared boats, loosely stated at 100, to co-operate with land force. We have only *Clyde* in the Gulf and *Dalhousie* at Maskat. I shall send Colonel Pelly back in the *Dryad*, if possible, as soon as she can be got ready."

* Tel. No. 230-P., 7th Feb. 1870.

123. The Bombay Government were asked:—

"Have you any information to show where Wahabi boats are likely to start from, and where likely to land? Is coast line and country between Kateef and Abou Dabai allied with, or feudatory of, Amir of Riad, or are tribes inhabiting it quite independent. Can you quote any precedent for our interference in Persian Gulf between two States who are not parties to maritime truce?"

124. This was answered on the 10th February:—

"The Wahabi boats are likely to start, some from Kateef, which is a Wahabi port, and others from the Guttur Coast, and to land at some point between Abuthabi and Shargah. The chief port of the Guttur Coast in Wukra, belonging to the Chief, Mahomed-bin-Saleh, who may be said to be independent, though he pays an annual sum to Bahrain, a portion of which goes to the Wahabi Amir.

"Shargah belongs to the Joasmi tribe who, as regards religious tenets, approach nearly to the Wahabis, though politically they are independent.

The Beni-yas tribe inhabiting the coast line adjacent to Abuthabi would not appear to be allied or feudatory to the Wahabis. The Chief of Abuthabi, who is at the head of the Beni-yas, has always been closely allied in interest to the Syud Saeed branch of Maskat. The Beni-yas tribe are stronger on land than the Joasms, and, therefore, exercise considerable influence over the surrounding Bedouin tribes, but the Joasms are more powerful at sea.

"The British Government has always been adverse to the extension of Wahabi influence in Oman. No precedent can be quoted of actual interference between the Maskat and Wahabi powers by our Government, but it has always lent a moral support to Maskat in the differences of that State with the Wahabis by sending vessels of war to the Arab Coast when hostilities threatened, and in one instance (in 1865-66 when the late Syud Thoweynee undertook to resist the Wahabi Amir) guns and material of war were supplied to the Sultan by our Government.

"The latter policy of the Indian Government has been, however, to forbid operations by sea in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman to any power whatsoever.


"In June 1868 the late Viceroy directed the prevention by force of any operation by Maskat against Persia, and, of course, would similarly have resisted any operation by Persia against Maskat. Similarly the Zanzibar Sultan has been told that operations by sea against Maskat would not be permitted, and the Government at Maskat has been prevented attempting to regain Gwadar and Charbar. The maritime truce affects only the smaller Chiefs on the Littoral; neither Maskat, Persia, nor the Amir of Riad are parties to it."

125. The following on the 7th February came from Bombay:—

"Following telegram received:—"Wahabi force approaching Maskat. Tribes in Jaalan southward are generally holding back. Appears at present doubtful if Azan can raise any sufficient opposing force." Telegram ends. My instructions of February 3rd were, to observe strict neutrality between contending parties, and to interfere with no operations by land, as force only sent to protect British subjects and property, and to maintain maritime truce by force if necessary; if thought necessary to alter these instructions, it will be best to do so at once, as three days will be lost in going to Jask, which is 150 miles beyond Maskat. *Bullfinch* reported to be ready on Wednesday."

These instructions to Captain Douglas were approved.

126. Major Way, writing from Maskat on January 21st, reported that men and money were being collected but slowly by Azan-bin-Gheis, who was endeavouring to recruit in Burka. His firm adherents, Ibrahim-bin-Gheis and Sheikh Salih, were at the same place, but their success was no better than their Chiefs. A rumour had reached him, for which he could not vouch, that the Beni-bo-Ali, against whom the Imam was lately victorious in Jaalan, had again rebelled had rescued some men of their tribe who had been taken prisoners, and had



refused to co-operate with the Imam against the Wahabis. A translation of a letter is also sent, in which the Amir of Nejd communicated to Syud Salem, the Ex-Imam, his advance against Oman, and promised to reinstate him. From the date of this letter, which must have travelled, if authentic, from the Amir's camp through Kishm to Maskat in three days, Colonel Pelly was inclined to doubt the fact of its having emanated from the Wahabi Amir, and inclined to the belief that it was the handiwork of Syud Salem or of Haji Ahmed. Major Way could not state the position of the Wahabi Army at the time that he wrote, all he knew being that it had left Hasa. Colonel Pelly, writing at Bombay on the 31st of January, on the strength of information received from Gwadar and Bushire, represented it as being at Katar, and Sheikh Saleh as being in Jaalan. Azan-bin-Gheis, he added, was endeavouring to obtain the support of the Chief of Abuthabi. This Chief was, unlike the rulers of Nejd and Oman, a signatory of the maritime truce. His principal port was well-situated for the landing of troops intended to operate against Beraymi, and preparations were on foot at Kateef for an expedition by sea to co-operate with the land forces.

127. Another report, to which Major Way was not able to attach full credence, was that an amnesty had been granted to all of the Naim tribe who might return to their allegiance to the Wahabis. This was the tribe for whose protection against Wahabi aggression Azan-bin-Gheis took up arms last year and stormed Beraymi. Khulelee by the latest account was at Maskat.

* No. 55, dated 14th February 1870.

128. The Bombay Government forwarded* further Maskat news in detail:—

"According to Sheikh Naeer, the Wahabi force, variously computed at two to five thousand men, and again at ten thousand men, was within five days of Beraymi. Azan-bin-Gheis had met with no support from the fighting tribes of the south. He had with him certainly not more than two thousand men. Some were inclined to put the strength of his followers so low as six hundred. The Chiefs from Ras-el-Khyma to Debaye were not hostile to the Wahabi Amir; the Chief of Abuthabi, though suspected of playing a double game, was likely to remain neutral. It was expected that the invaders would experience no check at Beraymi. In such case their next move would be in all probability to Sohar, and thence a passage by sea to Maskat might be attempted. To prevent such an attempt, Major Way urged on the Bombay Government the necessity of letting him retain the *Dalhouzie*, which the latter had telegraphed for, if her presence was not absolutely required at Maskat. The Amir had ordered at Katar a hundred vessels from his own coast for the embarkation of his troops. Syud Salem had expressed his intention of joining the Wahabis, but had not by the latest account left Kishm."


129. This information was sent to the Secretary of State in No. 17 of 22nd February 1870. *Inter alia*, it briefly recapitulated the events:—

"The advance of the Wahabi Amir upon Beraymi, as reported in the enclosures of this despatch, has somewhat altered the complexion of affairs. According to the latest report which we have received from Maskat, dated February 4th, the Amir of Riad had left Lahsa with a force probably not less than two thousand, or more than five thousand men, and was within five days' march of Beraymi. He had granted an amnesty to all the Naeem tribe of Beraymi who may return to their allegiance to the Wahabis, and had declared his intention of marching on the town of Maskat itself after reducing Beraymi. At the latter place it was anticipated that he would meet no check. The Chiefs from Ras-el-Khyma to Debaye had shown no signs of hostility to the Wahabis. Syud Salem had expressed his intention of joining the Amir's army, but by the latest account had not left Kishm. On the other hand, it is reported that Azan-bin-Gheis has not been successful in collecting men and money, and that the Chief of Abuthabi, on whose support he had counted, was likely to remain neutral. It is also rumoured that the Beni-beo-Ali, against whom Azan was lately victorious in Jaalan, have rebelled and refused to co-operate with him against the Wahabis."

130. Colonel Pelly, then at Government House, Calcutta, on the receipt of telegram from Maskat, reported (22nd February 1870):—

"On the whole, the Maskat Wahabi quarrel seems to be approaching its solution. And I would respectfully suggest that I return to the Gulf with all convenient speed, and with discretionary power to recognise Azan or otherwise, according as circumstances may seem to require; any recognition should be in writing, and should explicitly declare all questions of detail, Treaty, Convention, or claim to territory, to be reserved for subsequent discussion. •

"Meantime, I would propose addressing the subjoined telegrams to Major Smith and the Assistant Resident at Bushire.



"To Major Smith, Angaam: 'Proceed with *Kwangtung* to Bahrein and rendezvous *Clyde* I doubt the Amir molesting. If he do, prevent any boats arriving touching the island. If absolutely necessary, address a letter by direction to Amir informing him that I am instructed to maintain the maritime peace, and am embarking for the Arab coast. If all seem quiet at Bahrein, have *Clyde* there and proceed in *Kwangtung* along Arab coast, warning all parties against breach of truce, and informing them of my approach. From Arab coast return to Angaam and report, and look out for mail steamer.'"

131. These instructions were approved, and Colonel Pelly was requested to proceed to the Persian Gulf with all convenient speed, and invested with discretionary power to recognize Azan bin Gheis or otherwise as circumstances might seem to require, but with the explicit reservation of all questions of detail, Treaty, Convention, or claim to territory, as suggested, and provided that the advantage of Azan's recognition were not neutralized by this reservation. (Reported to Secretary of State in No. 19, 15th March 1870).

132. On 5th March Major Way telegraphed:—

"Maskat quiet. Syud Azan writes, 1st March, from Beraymi, 'Sheikh Zaeed of Abuthabi has arrived and sworn friendship and promised to oppose Wahabis. Mahomed Ali Naem sworn allegiance and promised Littoral Chiefs should visit me at Sohar. Sha'nt visit coast, but shall return to Sohar when arrangements finished for protection of Beraymi. Wahabis appear to be still at Katar. Not believed here that Wahabis can now come by land, and half of war tax has been returned. Can't say at this distance if attempt will be made by sea. Amulgavine Chief's cousin and Wahabi emissaries arrived at Kishm, and Syud Salem left for Amulgavine with them on 23rd.'"

133. On 21st March Colonel Pelly wrote:—

"All accounts concur in stating that the Wahabi Amir is still at his own fort of Ojair as already submitted. His Highness probably hesitates to leave the Abuthabi Chief in his rear, and his advance is, no doubt, rendered more difficult through the want of rain and consequent poverty of drinking water along the line of march.

"The alliance between the Abuthabi Chief and Syud Azan, and the fact of the latter's return to Maskat, tend to show that Azan's position is increasingly strong."

134. On 2nd April 1870 Colonel Pelly telegraphed:—

"Wahabi Amir still in his own territories. Doubt if he will attempt Beraymi this year. Bahrein proceedings have had good effect. All quiet down to date. *Clyde* still at Bahrein watching Wahabis."

135. Colonel Pelly reported on 8th April (in No. 147 from Bombay Government, 25th April 1870):—

"The Wahabis. It appears that some months ago the Wahabi Amir collected his forces in the neighbourhood of Hasa with intent to attack Beraymi. He communicated with the Chiefs of the Littoral as per margin, in view to their co-operation or neutrality, and these Chiefs, with the exception of Abuthabi, returned conciliatory answers, but the Wahabi Amir was deterred from further movement by the following considerations:—

"1st.—That rain not having fallen, water and grass were not available for his horses and men along the line of march;

"2ndly.—That the combination of the Abuthabi Chief with the Maskat Sultan rendered the march more hazardous;

"3rdly.—That the Amir, conscious of having harboured one of the Bahrein pirates and of having received the Bahrein plunder in his territories, feared that, sooner or later, we should demand satisfaction from him at his ports—Ojair and Kateef; and


"4thly.—In a minor degree, the Amir was suspicious of intrigue on the part of his relatives at his capital, Riadh.

"Influenced by the above considerations, the Wahabi Amir refrained from marching, and the season is now so advanced that it is doubtful if he will attempt anything this year. The most recent report is to the effect that he is already returning towards his capital."

136. On 7th May 1870 Colonel Pelly continued:—

"Several communications I have recently received concur in stating that the Amir himself has returned to his capital, and that Nasir-bin-Mobarek, the pirate Chief, who escaped from Bahrein, has sustained a defeat at the hands of certain of the inland Wahabi tribes. Some of the reports allege that Nasir-bin-Mobarek himself was killed in the fight, while other reports are to the effect that he fled, and that nothing certain had since been heard of him."

"P.S.—Since writing the above I have received a letter from the Bahrein Chief, in which he states that Nasir-bin-Mobarek was killed. It appears further that the defeat of his tribe (the Howajir) was complete."



XXIX—(1) Civil War between Abdullah and Saud his brother. (2)
The Turkish expedition into Nejd to assist Abdullah. 1870-1872.

137. Amir Abdullah had to abandon the prosecution of his war against Oman; for he had to face a more powerful enemy at home, his own brother Saud.

138. Abdullah ibn Feysal's character was never such as to win him much affection from the warlike nomad tribes, who constitute the fighting power of the Nejd. In early manhood, when heir apparent and practically regent for his blind father, he showed some energy and ability as a leader of raids, but what popularity he then enjoyed was far exceeded by that of his brother Saud, the beau-ideal of an Arab prince—handsome, reckless, frank and open-handed. On their father, Feysal's death in 1865, the inevitable contest began between the brothers for the Amirship. It lasted until 1870, when Abdullah, finally defeated, sought the aid of the hated, and, as the Wahabis of Nejd hold, infidel Turks. The result was that a Turkish expedition under Midhat Pasha, Vali of Baghdad, proceeding from Basrah by sea, occupied, with Abdullah's aid, the Hasa district of the Nejdean Principality.


139. In June 1871 the Turkish expeditionary force, consisting of 4,000 or 5,000 regular troops under command of Nafiz Pasha, disembarked at Katif, and marched unopposed to Hasa. In July 1871 the Sheikh of Koweit was sent bearing the Turkish flag to Bidaa on the Katar Coast, and the Arab Sheikhs induced to accept it. Abdullah bin Feysal had in the meantime won over the Beni-Kahtan tribe and, with their assistance, had engaged Saud west of Riadh, but was again worsted and joined the Turkish camp in Hasa. The inhabitants of Riadh, displeased at the overbearing conduct of Saud's Bedouin followers, now rose under the leadership of Abdullah bin Turki, and forced Saud to retire to Katar. Abdullah bin Turki then wrote to Nafiz Pasha and Abdullah bin Feysal, reporting that he had expelled Saud and requesting orders. In reply, Nafiz Pasha appointed him "Mudir" of Riadh pending the arrival there of Abdullah bin Feysal, and sent him money and provisions to aid him in holding the place. Saud next collected a force of the Ajman and Morrah and Dowsair Bedouins and attacked the Turks in Hasa, but sustained a defeat.

140. It was not long ere the Turkish authorities ceased, even in appearance, to act on behalf of Abdullah bin Feysal. It was alleged that the chief people of Hasa had addressed a petition to the Sultan praying His Majesty to take Nejd under the direct rule and appoint a Turkish Governor instead of a member of the Al-Saud family. The Hasa notables certainly maintained that they were under the impression that the petition they signed related to the assessment of the date groves, etc., but in November Midat Pasha appeared personally in Hasa bearing a gracious and favourable reply to the said petition. A notification was issued that the "Al-Saud has ceased to reign," and that Nafiz Pasha was appointed Muteserrif or Governor of Nejd; whereupon Abdullah bin Feysal fled from the Turkish camp to Riadh.

141. At the commencement of 1872, the Turks had possessed themselves of the fertile district and ports of Hasa and were reported to have collected materials for the construction of forts at Ras Tanurah, Ojair, and Bremeh, half way between the latter place and Hasa, as a means of keeping open their communication with the sea. The true nature of their policy in Nejd was now beginning to dawn upon Abdullah bin Feysal, who after escaping from their camp to his capital at Riadh, was said to have addressed a letter to the Turkish authorities complaining that, though they had entered his country with the avowed intention of restoring him to power, they had practically put him under restraint and purposed supplanting his dynasty and substituting their own authority. Other circumstances combined to favour the idea that they were determined at all hazards to occupy the country permanently.

Secret, May 1872, Nos 62 and 72.

The Governor of Hasa issued proclamations by which he claimed the right



of disposing of landed property there and promised advances without interest to landowners, assuring the people that the Sultan would not allow them to again become subjects of the sons of Feysal, and would afford due protection both in person and property to all those, who might desire to go on pilgrimage. Nor did Midhat Pasha relax his efforts to keep up the military strength of the Turks. The mortality amongst the troops at Khatif was excessive:

Secret, May 1872, No. 62.

several hundreds of invalids arrived in a deplorable condition at Baghdad, and their accounts of the state of those left behind were most depressing, but he showed no signs of relinquishing his aggressive policy and continued to pour in reinforcements at the risk of completely denuding Baghdad of troops.

142. At the commencement of 1872 Saud bin Feysal was said to be hovering about the neighbourhood of Katar with a small body of Bedouins and to be in communication with his brother Abdullah, who was then at Riyadh, but apparently losing what hold he still

Secret, May 1872, No. 66.

possessed over the affections of the people of Nejd. Both seem to have been much straitened for provisions and water and quite unable singly to cope with the Turks. Rumours of a reconciliation between them were rife, the first overtures having been made by Abdullah, who distrusted the Turks. Saud consented

Secret, May 1872, No. 74.

to his brother's proposals, but the coalition had no permanency, and the danger and embarrassment to which the Turks would have been exposed by the effective union of the brothers, who were reported to have collected a force of

Secret, June 1872, No. 120.

40,000 men and to be meditating a simultaneous attack on Khatif and Hasa, was averted by a renewal of their mutual jealousy and distrust; one of the principal causes of this in all probability was a treacherous attack by

Secret, May 1872, No. 84.

Abdullah on the Shammar tribe, partisans of Saud. Abdullah, who had a large force with him, remained inactive in Nejd, while Saud wasted his resources in petty quarrels with the tribes along the coast.

Secret, June 1872, No. 126.

143. Subsequently another attempt at reconciliation seems to have been made and the brothers were stated to have actually met and to have joined their

Secret, Oct. 1872, No. 101.

other brothers and the chiefs of Shammar and Nosim in taking solemn oaths of friendship and united action against the Turks; but an attack by Abdullah on the Ajman tribe, friends of Saud, revived the old enmity. There are many references in the newsgleanings from the Persian Gulf to Saud's wish to enter into negotiations with the Turks, while they

Secret, Feb. 1873, No. 159.

were quite prepared to shift the ground of their original argument for interference in Nejd affairs and come to terms with the man whose expulsion as the usurper of his brother's rights was the alleged object of their invasion of the country. Before describing these negotiations, an attempt made by Saud to procure the mediation of the British Government, and the correspondence which arose out of it, may be noticed.

XXX.—Saud's appeal to the Resident for the arbitration of the British Government, 1871—1872.


144. In September 1871 Saud remonstrated, in a letter to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, against the hostile action of the Turks in the Gulf waters, urging that he considered the peace of

Secret, March 1872, No. 252.

these waters to be under British protection, and soliciting the arbitration of that Government. The Bombay Government directed the Resident to inform Saud that

Secret, March 1872, No. 249.

it was impossible to offer arbitration without some assurance that it would be accepted by both parties, but they at



the same time represented to the Government of India the very serious result the Turkish Expedition might have in lessening British influence in the Gulf from the fact of its having been conveyed by sea. "It cannot be expected that the tribes of the Littoral should understand the principle by which they are precluded from undertaking the smallest military operation by sea, while at the same time the Turks are permitted to send an expedition like the present." They were therefore of opinion that the necessity of an offer of arbitration, or rather of good offices, which Saud seemed prepared to accept, should be strongly urged on the Secretary of State. The mischievous effects of the Nejd Expedition on the British position in the Gulf had been more than once pointed out to the Secretary of State for India, and his attention was again drawn to the subject by the transmission to him of the letter of the Bombay Government above referred to.

Secret, March 1872, No. 257.
Secret, March 1872, Nos. 254-255.

145. Saud again wrote to the Political Resident on the 22nd June 1872 as follows:—

"The Government ordered you to tell me that the friendship between the Government and me was firm. I never doubted this. I know this from afore-time. The friendship between you and me was on two accounts—1st, because we had been friends a long time; 2nd, that my country was safe from attack except from the seaside. I know that you are paramount at sea, and knowing the sea to be under your orders I was at ease in my country of Nejd. I made no arrangement for defending the sea-coast, but I thought that you were watching over the sea, and no one could come. I hope that you will be watchful of all things under your power, because it is your custom to always give help and watch over people's interest."

146. On the 6th March 1873, he wrote—

"I trusted and was easy as regards the sea-coast in reliance to your answer, the sea being in your charge and protection. I seek aid in two ways, for the Sirkar helps those who seek it from them or cast themselves on them."

"The sea is under charge of the Resident and I was careless about the sea owing to his word. I am at peace as regards the sea owing to his word, as he will not consent to disturbance at sea, and the Sirkar helps those who seek it and ask for it. They are bound to keep peace."


147. A fourth communication on this subject to Colonel Pelly, who had then left the Gulf, dated 18th May 1873, was as under—

"I have received from you several letters assuring me of peace at sea, and I felt convinced that I was in security and under your protection and that of the Sirkar. But the Government (Turkish) attacked me by sea. I then informed you of this fact and begged for a reply, and understood from your replies that you had my interests under consideration and would communicate again."

"You know that the whole of the people of these parts consider that this Gulf is protected by you and under your supervision. Such being the case it is not possible for you to keep silent in this matter, and must call them to account for infringing the peace of the sea."

148. The Government of India informed the acting Resident that unless Saud was a party to the so-called Maritime Truce, or had otherwise received assurances from the British Government, he was mistaken in supposing that the British Government had undertaken to protect his territories from attack by sea. As far as His Excellency in Council was then informed Saud bin Feysal was neither a party to the Truce nor had he received any assurances of protection. The Resident was to report as to whether anything had been said

Secret, October 1873, No. 441.



or done at any time to commit the British Government directly or indirectly to defend him or to use their influence to prevent attacks being made on him by sea: if no such obligation existed the Resident was to answer Saud's letter in general terms pointing out that he was mistaken in supposing that the British Government had undertaken to defend him from the sea, and adding a hope that he would soon be able to come to an amicable understanding with the Turkish Government.

Political, February 1874, No. 210.

149. The report thus called for, showed that Saud was not a party to the Maritime Truce, and that the British Government had been in no way committed to protect him by sea. The answers of the Resident to his letters had been written in general terms, and it was probable that the expressions in his letter of the 18th May 1873 "were prompted merely by the vague hopes and wishes so often entertained by semi-barbarous Chiefs in similar situations." Later communications from Saud showed that he had been undeceived as to the policy of the British Government and merely hoped for its good

Political, February 1874, No. 212.

wishes and friendship. Under these circumstances His Excellency in Council left it to the discretion of the Resident to answer Saud's letter of the 18th May 1873 either then or afterwards in general terms expressive of good will; should he again revert to the existence of any such assurance of security, matters were to be explained to him in such a way as to remove any existing misunderstanding which he might display and prevent the possibility of misunderstanding in the future.

XXXI.—Saud's negotiations with the Turks. 1872.

150. To return to Saud's negotiations with the Turks, the terms of this understanding were reported to be his recognition as Chief of Nejd on the condition of his paying the Turkish war expenses and the same yearly tribute that Feysal had paid. Two of his sons were to be sent to Baghdad as hostages, he was to consider himself as a tributary of the Porte and not to exercise any authority on the sea-board. If these terms did not suit him, he was to come to Hasa when the Turkish Government would restore to him his father's property and grant him a pension of a thousand dollars per mensem: these conditions would be fulfilled six months after his acceptance of them and on ascertaining that "he had served faithfully and given up all thoughts of opposition." Both parties professed their anxiety for a meeting to settle the terms of the arrangement, and letters were constantly passing between Ferik Pasha, Governor of Hasa, and Saud. The prevalent belief was that the Pasha's object in arranging this meeting was to effect the capture of Saud, but the latter's suspicions were aroused by the imprisonment of his friend, Sheikh Rohim, Chief of the El Ejman tribe, by the Turks; nothing was therefore settled, and Ferik Pasha was shortly afterwards recalled leaving behind him a character for leniency in his dealings with the people which for the time went far towards reconciling them to Turkish rule; but he was succeeded by another Ferik Pasha, whose oppressive conduct joined to the exactions of the soldiery very soon obliterated the favourable impression made by His predecessor.

Secret, April 1872, No. 75.

XXXII.—First Mission of Haji Ahmed to Baghdad. 1872.

151. Saud, however, did not abandon his hopes of effecting some settlement with the Turkish authorities, and after his failure to secure the arbitration of the British Government addressed Haji Ahmed Khan, formerly Minister at Maskat, and who was then at Bushire, on the subject. Haji Ahmed communicated Saud's wishes to the Resident and produced a letter from

Secret, August 1872, No. 179.



the former investing him with full powers of mediation with the Turks. By the advice of the Resident, Haji Ahmed communicated with the Turkish Consul at Bushire. The matter was then referred to the Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, Rauf Pasha, who had now succeeded Midhat Pasha, and in due course Haji Ahmed was summoned to Baghdad. He left Bushire on 5th July 1872 accompanied by the Turkish Consul, who had assured the Resident that the Turkish authorities were desirous of coming to a settlement with Saud; a statement which the chief Turkish official at Basrah repeated to Haji Ahmed. The Resident thought that Rauf Pasha was inclined to counteract his predecessor's policy in Nejd, and that the retirement of the Turks from Wahabi territory and the appointment of Saud as a tributary of Turkey with a guarantee of his good faith in the shape of hostages to reside at Baghdad would probably form the basis of the negotiations. The chief difficulties to the apprehended were the possible reluctance of Saud to trust himself in Turkish hands in order to conduct his negotiations with Haji

Secret, October 1872, No. 78-79.

Ahmed, the question of hostages, and the possibility of the negotiation not being completed before the departure of Rauf Pasha who had been recalled. Haji Ahmed arrived at Baghdad and telegraphed to the Resident, who had been directed not to interfere in the negotiations, that he had come to an understanding with the Pasha and was about to proceed to the Wahabi coast in order to carry into effect the terms of the arbitration; but although he

Secret, October 1872, No. 80.

described his negotiations as successful, the Pasha evidently insisted much on the presence of a hostage on the part of Saud. On his return from Baghdad he was conveyed to Khatif in a Turkish Steamer with friendly letters for Saud.

Secret, August 1872, No. 172.

From Khatif he went to Hasa, where he was entertained by the Governor and wrote letters to Saud, who was then several days' march from Hasa, to come there or else, if that were not possible, to appoint a place of meeting in the neighbourhood.

Secret, October 1872, No. 115.

152. The Resident considered that Saud was unquestionably desirous of concluding some arrangement under which the Turks should retire, and that they

Secret, October 1872, No. 114.

were equally anxious to withdraw from so costly and unprofitable an expedition as this had proved to be, but the ill-feeling between the brothers was of course a difficulty in the way of effecting a settlement. The belief he had previously expressed that Saud would hesitate before placing himself in the power of the Turks was soon confirmed, for several messengers were despatched to him by Haji Ahmed apparently in vain; for though he eventually moved

Also called Fahad bin Sintian.

Secret, February 1873, No. 173.

towards Hasa, he sent his cousin Fahad bin Abdullah in advance to ascertain the real intentions of the Turks, proposing to follow him after occupying Kherj as a means of guarding against any attack by Abdullah bin Feysal on his rear, or treachery on the part of the Turks in front. Fahad duly arrived at Hasa,

Secret, February 1873, No. 174.

where he was treated with much consideration by Ferik Pasha, but the terms offered by the Turks were distasteful to him, and Ferik Pasha would not agree to Saud's occupation of Kherj.

153. Soon afterwards Abdul Rahman, Saud's youngest brother, arrived at

Secret, February 1873, No. 200.

Hasa, and Haji Ahmed, who found that Saud could not be induced to come to Hasa on the terms proposed by the Turks, determined to return to Baghdad and complete the negotiation there, taking with him Abdul Rahman and Farhan bin Kheirullah. It is difficult to understand how Saud, who was well aware of the anxiety of the Turks to secure one of his sons as a hostage, could have been so imprudent as to have allowed him to undertake this journey.



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XXXIII.—Second mission of Haji Ahmed to Baghdad and confinement of Abdul Rahman bin Feysul, 1872—1873.

154. They embarked at Khatif on 24th October 1872. The Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, in noticing their arrival and that of a rival messenger from Abdullah bin Feysal on a similar errand, mentioned that though no definite arrangements had been made, Rauf Pasha had written to Saud encouraging him to hope for the sanction of the Porte to his nomination as Kaim Mukam of Nejd, but stating that the Turkish troops would not be withdrawn from Hasa. He thought that if the Porte were to recognize Saud on his undertaking to pay a reasonable revenue, withdraw its troops from Hasa, and leave him to establish his own power, Abdullah would soon disappear from the field, tranquility would be restored to the country, at any rate for a time, while the supremacy of the Ottoman Government would be recognized. Saud's prospects had now much improved. The capture of the Ejman Chief by the Turks had been the means of procuring him many adherents, while Abdullah's treacherous breaches of faith, notably in his attacks on the Shammari and Ejman tribes, had alienated from him most of his former friends. Saud, who was now at the head of a large force, was said to have worsted his brother in an engagement near Kherj and to have blockaded Riadh and plundered the surrounding country. Travellers from Hasa subsequently reported* the capture of Riadh and defeat and flight of Abdullah towards Koweit, while Saud was emboldened by his successes to threaten Ferik Pasha with attack unless he vacated the country. The report above alluded to was confirmed by a letter from Saud to the Resident; Abdullah was urged by his brother, Mahomed, to make his submission to Saud, but, though too weak to meet him in the field, he refused to do so. Saud appears now to have remained quietly for some time in Riadh, while Abdullah continued in the neighbourhood of Koweit.

155. Farhan bin Kheirullah was not detained long at Baghdad, but Abdul Rahman was evidently looked upon by the Turkish authorities as a hostage, placed under surveillance, and apparently treated with severity, while his distress was increased by the non-payment of the small subsistence allowance which had been at one time made to him by the Local Government. In February 1873, a few months after Abdul Rahman's arrival at Baghdad, Fahad bin Sintian, Saud's Agent at Hasa was arrested by the Turks and deported to Baghdad, probably in consequence of Saud's successes in Nejd, which was now reported to be entirely subject to him. Saud complained of this treachery to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, but the Government of India desired that he might be informed courteously that they declined to interfere in the matter.

XXXIV.—Visit of Abdullah's messenger to Baghdad, 1872—1873.

156. With reference to the messenger from Abdullah noticed above (paragraph 13), it appears that under instructions from Redif Pasha, who had succeeded Rauf Pasha, Mussur Pasha pensioned Ex Sheikh of the Montefik, wrote to Abdullah inviting him to Baghdad to confer with the Governor-General of Turkish Arabia. Abdullah in his reply, which he sent by his slave Mahbub, who was formerly Wazir to Feysal and Governor of Bereymi, but was driven out by the people of that place for his oppressive conduct, stated that he could not trust himself in the power of the Turks, repeated his complaints of their treatment of him, and instanced that of his relatives as an additional argument against his going to Baghdad. At the same time if they were really willing to aid him, they should instruct the Chiefs of Hasa and Khatif to submit to him and make over to him those districts for which he would pay



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anything they might demand. That he was ready to become the vassal of Turkey was further proved by a letter said to have been written by him to the Chief of Shargah, in which he said that if he obtained his wishes as regards Hasa and Khatif, he would march on Oman with a view to the capture of Bereymi, where his success would doubtless be welcome to the Turkish Government. The Assistant Resident did not put much faith in the genuineness of this letter, and later accounts agreed that Abdullah was quite unable to carry out his threat of invading Oman.

157. No arrangement seems to have been concluded with the Turks, for on the return of Redif Pasha, who was not at Baghdad when Mahbub arrived there, the Turkish policy in the Wahabi territory underwent another change; the arrangement with either of the sons of Feysul seems to have been considered impracticable, and the Governorship of Hasa was conferred upon Bezech Al Arayer, Chief of the Beni Khalid, on the security of his brother-in-law Nasir Pasha, Sheikh of the Montefik Arabs. The Beni Khalid were expelled from Hasa when Saud, called the First, conquered and annexed it to Nejd; their present Chief was stated by the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, to be a man of no special qualifications for the post, which he probably owed to his connection with Nasir Pasha, who had ingratiated himself with Redif Pasha. In consequence of his appointment it was further decided to withdraw the regular troops and entrust the defence of the frontier between Nejd and Hasa to a body of Gendarmerie to be raised in the country for that purpose. As the result of these changes four battalions of infantry returned to Baghdad having suffered in a stay of 14 months losses varying from 15 to 25 per cent. of their total strength. It was generally supposed that Saud bin Feysal would seize this opportunity of wresting this part of his father's territories from the feeble hands in which it was now placed. The appointment of Bezech was anything but popular at Hasa and several of the chief persons there prepared a remonstrance setting forth his unfitness for the post; the only result of this was their imprisonment by Nasir Pasha.

XXXV.—Release of Abdul Rahman bin Feysal. 1874.

158. Affairs in Nejd do not seem to have undergone any material change for the next few months until the release of Abdul Rahman, who remained in virtual captivity at Baghdad until August 1874, when he was set at liberty under the orders from the Porte, procured probably by the intervention of the British ambassador at Constantinople, to whom the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, had referred the case. Fahad bin Sintian also was shortly afterwards released and joined Abdul Aziz; who had gone to Bahrein.

Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal, on arrival at Bahrein, learned that, disgusted with the effete, cruel and rapacious rule of Bezech, the inhabitants of Hasa and the neighbouring districts were ripe for revolt, and only awaited a leader of the Saud family. Crossing to the mainland he was at once joined by bands of the Morah, Ejman, and other tribes, at the head of whom he marched on Hasa. The inhabitants welcomed him, and after a number of the Turkish gendarmes had been slain, the rest with Sheikh Bezech were besieged in the fort of Hofhuf.

159. Nasir Pasha, who had pledged himself to the success of the plan of appointing Bezech, was called on by Redif Pasha to quell the insurrection, and despatching 300 Arab horsemen by land proceeded himself by sea with a battalion of regular infantry to Hasa. Discord had broken out amongst the adherents of Abdul Rahman in Hasa owing to the jealousies of the leading Sheikhs of the Ejman, and on the approach of Nasir Pasha's force they dispersed, and Abdul Rahman joined Saud at Riyadh. The fort of



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Hofhuf, in which Bezech with his garrison had been shut up, having thus been relieved, the town was by order of Nasir Pasha given up to pillage, and for several days the Turkish soldiers and the Arab auxiliaries indulged in the indiscriminate massacre and plunder of the inhabitants; men, women, and children were shot down, and women openly treated with the brutality peculiar to such occasions. It is said that the Turkish officers remonstrated with the Pasha on permitting and even ordering such severities, but Nasir Pasha replied that it was necessary to make an example to prevent revolt in future.

Political A, May 1875, No. 132.

25. Nasir Pasha left his son Mazyad Pasha with 800 regular infantry and one hundred cavalry to hold Hasa, and himself returned to Basrah.

Political A, May 1875, No. 135.

XXXVI.—Death of Saud bin Feysal and election of Abdul Rahman as Amir of Nejd, 1875.

160. On the 26th March the Resident reported that news had been received of the death of Saud bin Feysal, Amir of Nejd, on the 25th January 1875. In a later letter of the 24th April this news was confirmed, and it was further reported that Abdul Rahman bin Feysal and the sons of Saud were desirous of making peace with Abdullah bin Feysal, the brother of the late Amir. The priesthood of Riadh, however, were averse to this on account of Abdullah's friendly relations with the Turks, and an armed force was said to have been sent against him from Riadh.

Political A, May 1875, No. 372.

Political A, May 1875, No. 376.

161. In May 1875 we received news from the Resident that Mahomed, the third son of Feysal, was said to have entered Riadh and made peace with his brother, Abdul Rahman, and Saud's relations, but that Abdullah bin Feysal had encamped outside the town. The Chief of Bahrein still continued to assist the Zobarites by sending provisions and materials to repair the fort, but he had hitherto refrained from despatching armed men.

Political A, June 1875, Nos. 219-212.

162. In July 1875 the Resident Persian Gulf, and the News Agent, Bahrein, received letters from Abdul Rahman, from which it appeared that on the death of his brother, Saud bin Feysal, he had been chosen by the general consent of the people to succeed Saud bin Feysal as Amir of the kingdom of Riadh, and had taken up his residence at the capital. He was said to be on friendly terms with all the relations excepting his brother, Abdullah, who with a small following was a fugitive in the desert without supporters. In reply to the enquiry, the Resident was informed that no reply should be sent to Abdul Rahman's letter.

Political A, September 1875, Nos. 43-58.

XXXVII.—Abdullah bin Feysal defeats Abdul Rahman, 1875—1880.

163. In September 1875 reports reached Bahrein that Abdullah bin Feysal had succeeded in collecting a considerable force with which he attacked and captured Riadh, and defeated the troops of his brother, Abdul Rahman. He was said to have obtained absolute authority at the capital and to be on friendly terms with Abdul Rahman and his relations.

Political A, October 1875, No. 100.

164. In November 1875 news-reports were received confirming this intelligence. It was said that all the tribes, with the exception of the Ajman had acknowledged Abdullah bin Feysal's supremacy, and that Mahomed and

Political A, December 1875, Nos. 53-55.



Abdul Aziz, the sons of Saud, had made their peace with him. He was endeavouring to gain the support of all the members of his family. "If, he said we had agreed, instead of quarrelling, Katif and Hasa would not have passed away from our possession, nor become Turkish territory."

165. It was also reported that, after his occupation of Riadh, Abdullah wrote to Mazyad, the Governor of Hasa, professing himself to be a Turkish subject and stating that he had not been rebellious or disaffected towards that power, as his brothers, Saud and Abdul Rahman, had been. Mazyad replied that he might be a Turkish subject on condition that he would oppose Abdul Rahman bin Feysal and Saud's children and banish them, and would himself pay a visit to Hasa. On hearing of Abdullah's reconciliation with his nephews, however, Mazyad discontinued all correspondence with him.

166. Abdullah was said to have written letters to the Pasha of Baghdad and Nasir Pasha Montefik on his recovering power in Riadh. An account of the disturbances, which commenced in September 1878, among the Montefik Arabs and the Beni Sad, and which led to frequent piracies in the Persian Gulf, is given in another part of this Précis (Piracies in the Gulf).

167. No further news of any importance was received regarding Nejd affairs until December 1878 when the News Agent at Bahrein reported that Mahomed bin Saud bin Feysal and his brother Abdul Rahman with about 60 followers had landed at Bahrein and been received by Sheikh Esau. On hearing this the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf instructed the News Agent to point out to Sheikh Esau the inadvisability of his receiving or countenancing persons who were lately making attempts to disturb the territories of a friendly power on the mainland.

168. In November 1879 the Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, received letters from El Hasa, stating that Mahomed, eldest son of the late Amir Saud of Nejd, had some weeks before regained possession of Kharj, from which his uncle Abdullah had expelled him and his brothers in April 1879. His occupation, however, was of short duration, for Amir Abdullah, on returning to Riadh from a successful expedition against a band of the Mutair Arabs, in which he had been engaged, made an unexpected raid on Kharj, surprised and captured his nephew, Mahomed, and conveyed him a prisoner to Riadh.

169. In March 1880 the Resident, Persian Gulf, reported that he had received intelligence of the reconciliation of Abdullah bin Feysal with his nephews, and that the Bedouins and people of central Nejd were generally united in his favor. He had come to an understanding with Mahomed bin Rashid, the Sheikh or Amir of Jebel Shammar.

170. In May 1880 the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, reported that Haji Abdul Ghanni Pasha had left Basrah on his way to Nejd to take up his appointment as Governor there.

XXXVIII.—Threatened revolt of the Montefik Arabs, 1880.

171. In the same month May 1880 a report reached Bushire from Bahrein of the imminence of risings of the Ayab tribes of Turkish Arabia and Nejd against the government of the Porte. Nasir Pasha Montefik, who was then at Constantinople, was said to be at the bottom of the movement, and he was believed to have invited Abdullah bin Feysal with his nephews to attack Hasa and Katif. With reference to this report Colonel Ross remarked—

"It is highly improbable that Nasir Pasha would under present circumstances instigate such a movement, and it is more likely the report of his doing so is disseminated by his enemies. That the Montefik Arabs are in revolt seems undoubted, and there is a widely



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spread expectation that the Wahabi leaders will seize the opportunity to renew the struggle in El-Hasa, but no sure or trustworthy intelligence has been received of the real policy and intentions of Abdullah bin Feysal and his supporters."

172. Similar rumours of the intention of Abdullah and his nephews to march against Hasa and Katif were received in August of the same year. At this time Abdullah and his nephews* continued to live in peace and friendship; the latter possessed Kharj, Hotah, Harik, Adaj, etc., and had followers of the Ajman, Morrah and Dowasir tribes. Abdullah continued to live in Riyadh with his brothers, Mahomed and Abdul Rahman. Two of his sons were said to have died of small-pox, and one only remained, named Turki, who was blind.

173. In September of this year it was reported from Bahrein that the combination against Hasa and Katif had collapsed owing to dissensions among the Chiefs of the Ajman tribe.

XXXIX.—Sheikh Abdullah bin Thanneyyan, 1879—1880.

174. About this time the Wahabi Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdullah Thanneyyan, of the Saud family, began to attract attention. This Sheikh was the son of Abdullah who, for a short time in 1842, was ninth Amir of Nejd, having headed a successful rising against the Egyptian garrison. He was a distant cousin of Abdullah bin Feysal. (See genealogical table above paragraph).

175. In October 1879 Colonel Ross reported that Abdullah bin Thanneyyan who had been residing at Basrah for three years past, endeavouring to obtain from the Turks the appointment of Governor of Hasa, had determined to proceed to Constantinople to try and obtain for himself—(1) the Amirship of Nejd, which he would hold as a feudatory of the Porte, and for which he would pay any reasonable tribute; or (2) the Governorship of Hasa on similar conditions; or (3) the proceeds of his share of the Saud property at Hasa and Katif, which the Turks had confiscated.

176. On his way down the Persian Gulf the Sheikh called on Colonel Ross at Bushire. He represented that he was proceeding to Constantinople with the object above stated, and he added that he had understood from the Turkish authorities at Basrah that the Porte would be glad to arrive at an understanding with the Saud family to relieve themselves of the expense of holding Hasa and Katif. He believed that though the Turkish authorities did not consider it politic to initiate the proposal, mediation would be acceptable, and that the most appropriate mediator would be the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

177. On arrival at Jeddah the Sheikh wrote to Colonel Ross explaining why he had left Basrah for Constantinople, and stating that he desired the British Ambassador to use his influence with the Porte. He pointed out the advantages to be gained by Turkey in making over Nejd, Hasa and Katif to the Saud family; and the advantages to England should he obtain what he wanted, and he concluded with a hint that if he was in want of funds to carry out his plans, the British Government might lend him what was needful.

178. In his despatch No. 31 of 23rd July 1880 the Secretary of State forwarded copy of correspondence regarding the designs of Sheikh Abdullah el Thanneyyan. On his way to Constantinople the Sheikh stayed for a time at Cairo, where he was lodged in one of the Khedive's palaces. Here he had two interviews with Mr. Malet, the British Consul, and explained his wishes. Mr. Malet referred to Her Majesty's Government for instructions as to how he should reply to the Sheikh. The London Foreign Office consulted the India Office on the subject, and the reply of the latter was that it was doubtful



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whether it was desirable that Her Majesty's Government should interfere with the discretion of the Turkish Government in the matter.

179. In September 1880 further correspondence was forwarded from the India Office, giving an account of the Sheikh's interview with the Vice-Consul at Damascus, and with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. He appears to have left Jeddah in March and reached Constantinople in August 1880.

Secret, October 1880, Nos. 163-160.

180. A letter from the Vice-Consul at Damascus, dated the 22nd July 1880, gives an interesting account of Mahomed ibn Rashid, the Ruler and Amir of the Jebel Shammar. Of Abdullah bin Thanneyyan he says—

"Altogether the Amir Abdulla, who called upon me, did not give me the impression that he was identified with any party in Aarid, but that he sought rather for personal motives to become, with or without the connivance of the Turkish authorities, ruler of El-Hasa; and ultimately, on the death of his uncle, the claimant by right of descent to the rule of Aarid. He spoke, perhaps naturally, in disparaging terms of the power and position of Mahomed bin Rashid, the present independent ruler and Amir of the Jebel Shammar, and the Flag E (Northern Nejd) districts, formerly tributary to the Wahabite monarchy. This bin Rashid is considered generally in this part of the country as all-powerful in Nejd, and is besides, according to some persons, perhaps the future leader of national aspirations in Central Arabia."

181. The Vice-Consul further observed that Turkey possessed no influence or authority in Nejd or Central Arabia. With reference to the existence of any national movement in Arabia he wrote—

"As much has been said in the European press of late as to a national movement in Arabia, I may venture to state that no evidence of such is obtainable in this quarter; and that as regards the Bedouin tribes of the Syrian desert, which are supposed to be becoming gradually inoculated with similar ideas, the tribal wars and feuds, now as ever prevailing among them, and their complete subjection to the Turkish authorities whenever they approach the Syrian frontiers, would tend to show that the time is yet distant when unity of action or purpose can be obtainable among them."

182. In October 1880 Government received a copy of a despatch from Mr. Zohrab, in which he gave a short account of the condition of Nejd, and the plans of the Saud dynasty. Before leaving Jeddah, Abdulla bin Thanneyyan had several interviews with the Consul, and gave him two documents, copies of which accompanied Mr. Zohrab's despatch. The first of these documents shows the line of succession in Nejd for the last 450 years, the second is an account of the struggle between Saud and his brother, Abdullah, who was aided by the Turks. The latter is written for publication in the English newspapers.

Secret, October 1880, No. 163.

183. From Abdullah bin Thanneyyan's account it would appear that after the death of Saud bin Feysal in 1874, his children being too young to govern were obliged to submit to their uncle, Abdullah bin Feysal, who virtually ruled in Nejd. Abdullah's adherents, the Wahabis, were opposed to the Saud faction, who desired the expulsion of the Turks from the coast line, the development of trade, free communication with other nations, and the moral support and protection of England.

184. Abdullah bin Thanneyyan explained to Mr. Zohrab that numbers of Nejdians had in recent years travelled to India and other foreign countries for trading purposes, which partly accounted for the liberal views of the Saud party, and in addition the dread of seeing the Turks push further into the country had raised a strong and influential party in favour of British protection. Once recognized by England as an independent people, this party thinks the Sultan could be induced to withdraw from the insignificant points held by his troops in Nejd; but if he declined to do this, they believe they could drive his troops out. They also hope that free intercourse with other countries would soon break that fanaticism for which the Nejdians have a not enviable reputation.

185. Mr. Zohrab adds—

"How far it may be of advantage to England to countenance the hopes and wishes of Nejd is not in my province to discuss; but I will venture to point out that as there appears to



be a serious revival in the Mussulman world—a movement which may give much trouble if not properly met—there may be great benefit in our having a commanding voice in the country which, I may say, governs the actions of all Mussulmans. That country is Arabia, i.e., Yemen, Hedjaz, Tehema (the province in which, properly speaking, Jeddah and Mecca are situated), Nejd, &c."

186. Mr. Zohrab's views regarding a national movement against the rule of the Sultan in Arabia are exactly opposite to those, above quoted, of the Vice-Consul, Damascus. He says—

"That the whole of Arabia is becoming hostile to the rule of the Sultan is no secret, and I do not believe there is a doubt that the revival of the Khalifat in the person of the Grand Sherief of Mecca is being seriously discussed and may soon be attempted."

XL.—State of affairs in 1881.

187. Abdullah bin Feysal was in Riadh. Mahomed bin Saud was in Kharj and occasionally paid his uncle a visit, as also did the elders of the Ajman tribe, Hazam and Rankan. The agent of the Pasha of Hasa had invited the Ajman chiefs to return to Hasa and promised that their allowances would be continued to them. They refused to go however, and requested that the allowances might be paid to their agents in Hasa.

XLI.—Rise of the Shammar Principality, 1835--1882.

Here we must pause a little and trace the rise of the Shammar principality, which soon plays an important part in the history of Nejd.

The following account in this chapter is taken from Mr. Blech's Memorandum. Enclosure to No. 365 in Secret E, August 1904, Nos. 286-473.

188. At the earliest period of the history of Central Arabia, the numerous and powerful tribe of Tai from the Yemen occupied the Jebel Shammar. About 500 A. D. occurred the celebrated conflict between the tribes of Nejd, headed by Koleib Wail, Chief of Taghleib, and the armies of Yemen, led by the Lakhmite Chiefs; the latter were overthrown, and the entire Nejd delivered from the Kahtanite yoke. In this war Tai, though of Yemenite origin, sided with the Nejdean clans of Rabia. Soon after these clans engaged in civil war, upon the treacherous murder of Koleib by his kinsman Jessas. This caused many important changes in the relative position of the central tribes, and a large settlement of Beni Taghleib, Beni Abs and Howazin took place within the limits of Jebel Shammar, where the new settlers united with the elder inhabitants, or Beni Tai, and from this union sprang the tribe of Shammar still so called.

189. In the earlier years of Moslem rule we find this district still powerful and independent, resisting successfully all the efforts of the Ommiad Caliphs, whose armies were signally defeated at the entrance of these mountains during the reign of Merwan, towards the beginning of the eight century. Their subsequent history remains for a long time a blank. Some of the clan Shammar, notably the Bedr, were still Christians when they repulsed the Ommiad troops. Probably they eventually professed Islam. But they afterwards relapsed in to semi-barbarism, resumed pagan forms of worship, and split up into small factions.

190. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the province underwent the short-lived tyranny of the first Wahabi Empire, and like other districts was but tensiently affected by it. At this time Hail was already looked upon as in a manner the capital of Jebel Shammar partly owing to its size and wealth, partly to its central position. Supreme rule was exercised in the family of Beit Ali, ancient denizens of the city.

191. But one Abdullah-bin-Rashid then lived in Hail. He was of the clan of Isafer, the noblest branch of the Shammar tribe. Many of his relations were Bedouins, though his own direct ancestors had long been townsmen. Wealthy high born and conscious of ability and vigour, he aspired



to wrest the hitherto undisputed pre-eminence from the chiefs of Beit Ali, and his numerous and powerful relatives lent their aid to his endeavour. In Hail itself Abdullah's party soon became the stronger, but the neighbouring village of Kefar, then almost as strong and populous as Hail, held to Beit Ali.

192. The struggle then began, and was unfavourable to Abdullah, who was driven into exile about 1818 or 1820. Accompanied by a band of his relatives, he took the road of the Jof, and, failing to find assistance, passed on the Wadi Sirhan. Here, however, the fugitives were attacked by a strong party of Aneyza Bedouins, the hereditary enemies of the Beni Shammar. After a desperate struggle all Abdullah's companions were slain, and he himself left for dead. Tradition ascribes his surviving to the miraculous aid of insects and birds, and to the assistance of a passing caravan, by whom Abdullah was taken on to Damascus, and tended until complete recovery. Returning then to Arabia, he received a ready welcome from Turki-ibn-Saud, the Wahabi Amir, and became one of his principal generals. Practically the leader of the expedition sent in 1831 against Hasa under Feysal, it was he who induced the Prince to march straight back upon Riadh as soon as the news of Turki's murder and Meshari's usurpation reached the front.

193. It was, moreover, Abdullah who, on the twenty-first day of the siege of the palace of Riadh, in which Meshari was entrenched, slipped out by night with two trusty kinsmen of the Shammar, induced a friendly palace retainer to draw them up by ropes through one of the windows, penetrated to Meshari's sleeping apartment, and killed the usurper after a protracted struggle, in which Abdullah's two comrades lost their lives. In gratitude for these services, Feysal named him absolute Governor of Shammar Province—in Doughty's words, to be his constable of the western marches of Nejd—to govern Aneyza and its southern tribes, with right of succession, and supplied him with troops and all means for the establishment of his rule.

194. Abdullah then returned to Hail, and driving out the rival family of Beit Ali, became supreme ruler. His brother Obeid pursued the fugitives into Kasim, and there ravaged the country, and cut off the Beit Ali root and branch.

195. Meanwhile, Abdullah consolidated his power in the Jebel Shammar, beyond which, however, his sway did not extend. All his life-time he paid tribute to Feysal, and moreover, caused the Wahabi tenets to be recognised as the official faith of the State, in spite of the unpopularity of this measure, not apparently from religious conviction, but out of policy. He died in 1844 or 1845 while engaged in rebuilding Hail, and left three sons, Tilal, Mutaab, and Mahomed, besides his surviving brother, Obeid. Tilal's popularity insured his succession, and he seems to have been a pattern ruler. Besides continuing his father's improvements at Hail, he sent his uncle, Obeid, on an expedition against Kheibar, which was conquered, and fell under the Shammar rule.

196. Not long after, Kasim, weary of Wahabi tyranny, annexed itself to the Shammar kingdom. Tilal apologized to Feysal, who felt too weak to protest against this aggrandizement of his powerful vassal at his expense, and was obliged to acquiesce.

197. Meanwhile, Tilal himself led a successful foray against Teima and the neighbourhood, and in 1855 conquered the Jof and destroyed the family of Beit Haboub, hitherto supreme there. Every-where he subjugated the Bedouins. By a wise tolerance he induced Shiahs and other heretics to settle at Hail, and suffered much relaxation of the strict Wahabi doctrines, in spite of the protestations of Feysal, still nominally his overlord, and one whose daughter was married to him. He had also to preserve appearances with the Sultan, whose name looms large in the Friday prayers at Hail, but who derives no other benefit from the province.

198. Tilal still preserved the appearance of being a vassal of Ibn Saud, and repaired every year to Riadh with a present of horses. Returning in 1867 he fell sick, and sent eventually to Baghdad for a Persian doctor, who told the



Amir that his understanding would become affected by his malady. "Mad! and I, the Amir," ejaculated Tilal, and, as Doughty says, "because his high heart might not longer endure to live in the common pity, he set his pistols against his manly breast and fired them and ended."

199. He was succeeded by his brother Mutaab, a mild mannered and intelligent man, who, however, after two years was assassinated by Tilal's two sons, Bardar and Bedr, at which the former succeeded him.

200. Meanwhile Mahomed, brother of Tilal and uncle of Bandar, fled to Riyadh. Here Abdullah-ibn-Saud brought about a reconciliation between him and Bandar, and Mahomed at the latter's invitation returned and became again Governor of the Baghdad Haj caravan. On one occasion when returning to Hail he sent before him to greet the Amir Bandar. The latter, being displeased, refused him admittance to Hail and rode out with Bedr and Hamud to meet him, causing the town-gates to be shut behind them. A dispute arising Mahomed killed Bandar; then entering the town, he and Hamud ordered the slaughter of all the children of Tilal.


201. Mahomed thus began his long reign which lasted till his death in 1897. In his time the Ibn Rashid dynasty reached its highest pitch of power. The homage to Ibn Saud was gradually disused in the decay of the Wahabi State, and in 1876 Ibn Rashid was the greatest Prince in Nejd. His was, according to Doughty, a ruler of factious Arabs by right to the sword: none of them, not persuaded by fear, would be his tributaries. The bloodshed attending his accession and the severity of his methods caused as much reprobation as terror among the Arabs, but all were obliged to admit that his rule was strong and successful. "I think it would be hard to find a fault in Ibn Rashid's Government," says Doughty in words which recall Palgrave's dithyrambic praise of Tilal.

202. Mahomed-ibn-Rashid, early in his reign, endeavoured to withstand a Turkish expedition against the Jof in 1872: he was, however, defeated and glad to submit to terms, paying an annual tribute of 1,500 Mejids for the Jof, and admitting a Kaimakam and garrison to reside there. Doubtless this impressed him with a great idea of Turkish power, for even when at the height of his glory, and while humbling the Ibn Saud house to the dust in 1888, he posed as the officer or Lieutenant of the Ottoman Government.

203. To give figures is but misleading; however, Doughty, in a style more convincing of veracity than Palgrave, says that Mahomed Ibn Rashid might summon 2,000 fighting men from his villages and about 1,300 nomad Arabs; he is said to have 400 horses. His boundaries were: on the north the Roualla, northern Shammar and Thuffir, friendly but not tributary tribes; on the east his limits were at the dominion of Boreydah, which includes a good many villages in the Nefud of Kasim; captured by Mahomed-ibn-Rashid in 1888, it has again passed into the hands of Ibn Saud; in the south his limits are at about 100 miles from Medina; his western boundary is the Syrian Haj road.



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XLIII.—Hostilities between Abdullah-bin-Feysal and Ibn Rashid, 1882—1886.

205. The death of Amir Feysal of Nejd was soon followed by internecine civil wars between his sons Abdullah and Saud. This afforded Mahomed Ibn Rashid opportunities to extend his power and consolidate his control over the tribes in Nejd adjoining his territory. The important tribe of Majma in Kasim placed itself under his protection. He gradually detached from the Nejdean principality the two rich districts of Boreydah and Sedeyyir. Though nominally vassal of the Wahabi Amir, Ibn Rashid was virtually independent of him, and made attempts to extend more and more his dominion in his lord's territory.

206. In the autumn of 1882, Abdullah-bin Feysal endeavoured to recover the district of Majma in Kasim. This attempt brought the latter chieftain into the field, and Abdullah, outnumbered, retired to Riyadh. There he learned that Ibn Rashid had entered into correspondence with his nephews, the sons of Saud, and had made overtures to them with a view to inducing them to take part against their uncle, or else to remain neutral. This, apparently, alarmed Abdullah, who, therefore, in March 1883, placed his relations with his nephews on a new footing, under which Abdullah-bin-Feysal was recognized as "Imam," or religious head of the Wahabis of Riyadh, and the military power was entrusted to Mahomed-bin-Saud as Military Commander. Mahomed-bin-Saud, supported by the tribes Ateybah, Suhul, and Sobeyyah, marched against the tribe Bureyyah, and carried away numerous camels and cattle.

Hostilities then commenced between the Al-Saud and the chief of Jebel-Shammar. The chief tribes which rallied to the standard of Mahomed-bin-Saud were the Ateybah, the Kahtan, the Moteyr, the Sobeydah, the Suhul, the Dowasir, the Ajman, the Almorah, or rather fragments of those tribes. Mahomed Ibn Rashid commanded the Shammar, Harb, and Boreyah tribes. Their hostile operations did not go beyond raids and counter raids into one another's territories. Neither side appears to have gained any decisive successes.

207. Mahomed-bin-Saud was however soon alienated from his uncle Abdullah, he appears to have learned from intercepted letters that Abdullah was intriguing for his defeat and murder and thereupon threw up the command of the forces, and retired with his brothers to Kharj. While the Wahabi Amir's party was growing weaker, the Abel-Shammar Sheikh, grew more powerful every day. He was reported to be friendly with the Sheikh of Koweit.

208. In April 1885 Ibn Rashid attacked two sub-tribes of the Ajman, who were encamped at the waters of Owaineh to the north of Hasa and plundered their houses and cattle. The Ajman tribe having subsequently received reinforcements, pursued Ibn Rashid and succeeded in re-capturing some of their horses and killing others. This incursion by Ibn Rashid was reported to be due to the Ajman tribe having attacked some people under his protection.

209. In May 1886 a Turkish mission went to Hail to induce Mahomed Ibn Rashid to allow the erection of a mosque and a Government school at that place. Mahomed Ibn Rashid dismissed the mission with presents but without acceding to their request. It was also reported that in the previous year (1885) valuable presents had been taken to Mahomed Ibn Rashid by the Turkish head of the mission, with a view to induce him to allow the erection of a mosque and school at Hayil.

Mahomed Ibn Rashid reported to be in command in 1886 of a force of 2,000 horse-men, 15,000 foot and camel men, and had four field pieces, also 1,000 breech-loading rifles.



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XLIV.—Imprisonment of Abdullah-bin-Feysal and absorption of the Wahabi Kingdom in the Shammar Principality, 1887—1896.

210. In the autumn of 1887 intelligence was received that the sons of Saud-bin-Feysal, had seized and imprisoned their uncle Abdullah. Letters were written by Mahomed-bin-Saud to the Chief of Bahrein and to the various Arab Sheikhs of Oman, announcing his accession as Amir of Nejd.

External A., February 1887, Nos. 169-182.

211. But the triumph of Mahomed-bin-Saud was short lived, for the more powerful Amir of Jebel Shammar, speedily marched against him up to the gates of Riyadh, which place capitulated after a short defence. Abdullah-bin-Feysal was then released and re-instated, and Mahomed-bin-Saud retired to Kharj. It was, however, arranged that Abdullah should accompany Mahomed bin Rashid back to Jebel Shammar, his younger brother Mahomed-bin-Feysal acting as Governor of Nejd, assisted by an Agent of Ibn Rashid.

External A., April 1888, Nos. 182-88.
External A., April 1888, Nos. 233-34.
External A., May 1888 Nos. 116-117.
External A., August 1888, Nos. 82-83.
External A., September 1888, Nos. 127-29.

212. The forces of Ibn Rashid were too formidable and well appointed to allow of any successful resistance on the part of the adherents of the Wahabi Amirs. The Shammar Chieftain was, nominally at least, the vassal of Turkey. He at once communicated the news of his victory to the Turkish authorities, by whom it was received with the utmost satisfaction.

Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1887-88.

213. In the month of August 1888 three of the sons of Saud-bin-Feysal namely Mahomed, Saad and Abdullah, were put to death in Kharj by Ibn Sabhan, the Agent of Rashid. Accounts vary as to the reason for this massacre, but it seems probable that their uncle Abdullah-bin-Feysal instigated the murder of these princes. The eldest, Mahomed-bin-Saud, was much beloved in Nejd on account of his chivalrous and liberal disposition. For months the Bedouin Arabs refused to credit the news of his death, and rumours were everywhere prevalent that Mahomed had escaped, and was living amongst Bedouins in the desert. Only one son of Saud survived, Abdul Aziz, and he resided at Hail, as also did his uncle, Abdullah-bin-Feysal, now styled the "Imam" in Nejd. The power of Mahomed-ibn-Rashid was then paramount throughout Nejd from the confines of Syria to Hasa. In the time of the Amir of Nejd Feysal-bin-Turki as noted above Abdullah-bin-Rashid, father of the present Amir of Shammar, was appointed "Mahafidh," or warden of the frontier, by the Wahabi Chief, and, latter, Mahomed-ibn-Rashid was befriended by Abdullah-bin-Feysal, and owed to the latter his accession to power in Hayil. Now, owing chiefly to family dissensions, the Wahabi princes had lost their authority, and the relative positions had completely changed.

External A., October 1888, Nos. 92-93.
External A., October 1888, Nos. 61-63.
External A., October 1888, Nos. 125-127.
External A., October 1888, Nos. 180-181.

External A., January 1889, Nos. 74-75.

214. There were at this time persistent rumours of an invasion of Oman by Ibn Rashid in conjunction with Sheikh Jasim of Katar and under the auspices of the Porte.

External A., September 1888, Nos. 127-129.
External A., November 1888, Nos. 102-151.
External A., February 1889, Nos. 216-226.
External A., February 1889, Nos. 347-357.
External A., May 1889, Nos. 69-81.

215. Representation were made to the Porte in the matter, and the Porte denied that there were any communications between Ibn Rashid and the Sultan, except exchange of presents. From the British ambassador—Sir W. White's letter, dated 9th May 1889, it appears that Ibn Rashid was anxious to secure from the Sultan jurisdiction over Hasa, while the Sultan was desirous of securing a greater hold over Nejd and Shammar. Both these purposes could not be attained having regard to the facts that the Porte's policy was to extend its jurisdiction over the Arab littoral, and the ambition of Ibn Rashid to be practically independent ruler, only nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan.

External A., July 1889, Nos. 235-239.



216. In the year 1890 a more serious attempt than usual was made by Abdul Rahman-bin-Faysal to shake the power of Ibn-Rashid, and having marched against Riadh he captured and imprisoned Ibn Sabhan, Agent of Ibn Rashid. The Chief of Oneyza (Zamil) and the chief of Boreyda (Muhannah) with the people of Kasim espoused his cause.

External A., October 1890, Nos. 120-25.
External A., November 1890, Nos. 40-49.

217. Riadh was soon besieged by Ibn-Rashid and bombarded, but with no distinct effect; eventually peace was concluded between him and Abdul Rahman. By its terms Riadh remained in the hands of the Al-Saud, who ceded to Ibn-Rashid, Washam and Sedeyyir, with their dependencies. The fort of Kharj, which the Al-Saud failed to take, was placed in charge of one of Ibn-Rashid's officers. Both parties wrote to the Mutasarrif of Hasa; Ibn-Rashid, to denounce Abdur Rahman as meditating an attack on Hasa, and the latter, recounting the usurpations and ruthless tyranny of his adversary, and professing his obedience to the Turkish authorities, who were disposed to listen favourably to him.

External A., November 1890, Nos. 40-49.
External A., February 1891, Nos. 63-64.

218. In the early part of 1891 it was reported that Ibn-Rashid had succeeded in recapturing Riadh. He was not so successful at first in a contest with the people of Kasim, who, after two defeats, were said to have inflicted severe loss on him in an action fought early in February. The success of the Kasim people, if there was any at all, was however short-lived. About the middle of February 1891, they were completely routed in a battle and the chiefs of Oneyza, and Boreyda were slain. This defeat proved disastrous to the cause of Abdul Rahman, and he was then a wandering fugitive trying to escape to Bahrein.

External A., April 1890, Nos. 36-41.

219. In March 1895 Mahomed Ibn Rashid having attacked and plundered the Ajman tribe near Sulu, the headman appealed to the Turkish Governor at Hasa, claiming protection as they paid taxes. The Governor ordered an expedition against Mahomed Ibn Rashid; but the Commandant of the forces refused to move without superior orders, and the Governor then wrote to Mahomed Ibn Rashid, the latter replying that his action had been in the interests of law and order in-as-much as the Ajman were robbers.

External A., May 1895, Nos. 77-78.

220. An interview, which Sheikh Jasim had requested, was declined by Mahomed Ibn Rashid for fear of giving offence to the Turkish Government.

About the middle of the year 1895 disorders and insecurity on the trade routes were caused by the predatory raids of the Ajman, Morah and other tribes under the nominal suzerainty of the Turks. In June the caravan traffic between Nejd and Koweit was thus interrupted, and in October Mahomed Ibn Rashid appealed to the Governor of Hasa to guarantee the safety of the roads to Nejd and Kasim, failing which he claimed discretion himself to chastise the tribes named, as disturbers of the peace of his territory.

Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1895-96.

XLV.—Complications with Koweit. 1897—1904.

221. There is nothing in the records of the affairs of Nejd in 1896. In 1897 there arose complications with Koweit, which still continue to occupy the Arab tribes in internecine wars and have attracted a good deal of attention from the Turkish Government on the one hand, with German Kaiser probably behind the scenes, and from the British Government on the other. A detailed narrative of these interesting events is given in the *Précis of Koweit Affairs*. A brier summary of the facts will suffice here.



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222. At end of 1897 Abdul Aziz, nephew of Mahomed-ibn-Rashid, succeeded to the Chiefship. It was reported that the sons of the late Koweit Sheikh who had been murdered by his brother Mubarak had enlisted the Jabal Shammer Sheikh on their side; a descent on Koweit was contemplated in order to oust Sheikh Mubarak, but never actually carried out.

223. Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal, who had been living for the past three years with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit won over to his side some of the Arab tribes so long the partizans of Ibn Rashid, and thus a split took place between the various tribes in Nejd. Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal then marched to Nejd and asked for help from Mubarak of Koweit. Meanwhile Abdul Aziz-ibn-Rashid, Amir of Nejd, and the nephews of Mubarak of Koweit were together plotting against Sheikh Mubarak. The Amir tried to get the Turks to countenance his action against Mubarak. It was reported that a fight between the parties was imminent. Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal (with Mubarak's connivance) raided the Amir's territory, to weaken his authority. The Amir with a large force threatened Koweit and demanded satisfaction. The crisis subsided as the Amir requested the Turks to redress his grievances, thus professing himself a vassal of the Sultan. The whole of this part of Arabia was in a turmoil owing to the quarrel between Koweit and Nejd, the Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid having on his side the nephews of Mubarak, the Sheikh of Koweit, and the rebel Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim. Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal rejoined the Koweit Sheikh from Nejd. It was thought advisable to avoid conflicts between Nejd and Koweit as it placed the Sheikh more and more in the power of the Turks.

1901.

80. More preparations on both sides went on for a campaign.


224. In February Mubarak was reported at a place one day's march from Nejd with 70,000 men. Ibn-Rashid's whereabouts were unknown, but he asked Jasim of Katr to help him. Abdul Aziz-bin-Feysal, son of Abdul Rahman, was appointed Governor of Riyadh, which place had been occupied by Mubarak's forces; the whole of Nejd submitted without fighting to Mubarak. In February Abdul Aziz-ibn-Rashid was three days from Hayil, helpless and fleeing from Mubarak. A severe fight took place on the 17th March near Hayil in which Mubarak was defeated and dispersed. Amir-Ibn-Rashid was not likely to attack Koweit without the Sultan's leave; who seemed to be backing him quietly and probably wished to profit by the quarrel to occupy Koweit. In May both parties asked for British protection, but the Nejd Amir required deposition of the Koweit Sheikh Mubarak, against whom he had grievances. In August the Turks continued retaining the Amir of Nejd from reprisals on Koweit.

225. The Turks encouraged the Nejd Amir to force measures against Mubarak of Koweit secretly. There was recapture of Riyadh by bin-Saud people (this is Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin Feysal) and general disaffection against Ibn-Rashid in whole of Nejd. The Amir retaliated by raids. All southern Nejd acknowledged Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal, and he was probably stronger than the Amir at this time. Amir Rashid wrote to Constantinople accusing British of supporting Koweit. In July Ibn-Rashid was reported to be preparing for attack on Riyadh and boasted that he had the support of Turkish guns.

226. A Turkish Order in brilliants was gazetted to Abdul Aziz-ibn-Rashid and minor Orders conferred on various dependents in token of loyalty to the Porte.



"دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون
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227. In November 1902 another battle took place in Southern Nejd, which resulted in a severe defeat to Amir of Nejd (Ibn-Rashid) by Abdul Aziz bin-Abdul Rahman-bin-Feysal. This greatly strengthened the latter's power throughout Nejd.

Secret E., February 1903, Nos. 163-307.

1903.

Secret E., April 1903, Nos. 23-70.
Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 307-335.

228. In December 1902 Amir Ibn-Rashid raided in the neighbourhood of Koweit and got off again without any reprisal being taken. The Amir was in Kasim but very weak owing to dejection of his men to Abdul Aziz-bin-Feysal. Abdul Rahman-bin Feysal also settled at Riadh with his son Abdul Aziz. Two skirmishes took place in March, in both of which the Amir was defeated and cattle, etc., captured from him. Abdul Aziz whilst on a visit at Koweit, visited the Russian ship *Boyarin* and was offered money and rifles to help against Nejd by the Russian Consul. The Sheikh of Koweit, Mubarak, was again warned not to interfere in Nejd, but he has all along tried to help his friends the bin-Feysal in their aspirations.

229. The Nejd Amir was himself weak owing to dejections to his rivals the bin-Feysal family, who had the whole of Southern Nejd entirely under their sway and other parts partially so. The Amir Ibn-Rashid, however, has had the almost open support of the Porte. On the other hand the bin-Feysal family the support of the Koweit Sheikh, but this support was accorded them in spite of all representations from the British Government to the Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, not to mix himself up in Nejd affairs. It was natural that he should support the bin-Feysal, as his worst enemies, viz., Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim and his nephews are arranged on Ibn-Rashid's side.

230. In the beginning of the year 1904, the bin-Feysal conquered a portion of northern Nejd and their power was on the ascendant. The Amir Ibn-Rashid applied to the Turks for protection, and in March there were reports of a large assistance in men, arms and money having been despatched by the Turkish Government to him from Baghdad.


5th October 1904.

J. A. SALDANA.

G. C. Press, Scania.-No. 817 P. D.-6-10-04.-20-M. D.




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


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


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"دليل الخليج، الجزء الأول: المواد التاريخية والسياسية: ملخص حول شؤون
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